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INTRODUCrION
It is indisputable that the Internet has revolutionized how we ex-
change information, communicate, educate students, and transact
business.' In response to this revolution, the United States Govern-
ment developed the surveillance technologies necessary to keep pace
in an ever-changing world where crime unfortunately still takes place.
InJuly 2000, the American public was introduced to one of these new
technologies, aptly named "Carnivore,"2 the latest surveillance tool
used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to combat illegal
activity on the Internet.
Carnivore is an electronic surveillance system that monitors a
targeted user's e-mail, web browsing, and file transfer activity.3 The
I See H.R REP. No. 106-932, at 4 (2000), available at ftp://ftp.loc.gov/pub/
thomas/cp106/hr932.txt (last visited May 1, 2001). This Congressional Report indi-
cates that Internet use in the United States alone has grown from 65 million users to
over 100 million users between 1998 and 1999 and is expected to reach 177 million
users by 2003. See id. By that time, the worldide use of the Internet is expected to
exceed 500 million users. Id. "Business-to-business electronic commerce totaled over
$100 billion in 1999... and is expected to grow to over $1 trillion by 2003." Id.; see
also The "Carnivore" Controverny: Electronic Surveillance and PivaO , in te Digital Age: Hear-
ingBefore the Senate Cofm. on theJudiciar, 106th Cong. 3 (2000) (statement ofJames X.
Dempsey, Senior Staff Counsel, Center for Democracy and Technology) [hereinafter
Dempsey Statement], available at http://iv.cdt.org/testimony/000906demp-
sey.shtml (last visited May 1, 2001) ("Individuals, civil society, businesses and govern-
ments are all rushing to use the Internet .... The Internet has become a necessity in
most workplaces and a fixture in most schools and libraries. Soon, it may converge
with the television and wireless phones, and thereby become nearly ubiquitous.").
2 SeeJohn Schwartz, FBI's Internet Wiretaps Raise Privaiy Conras, WALL Sr.J.,July
12, 2000, at Al ("The new computer system [is] dubbed 'Carnivore' inside the FBI
because it rapidly finds 'meat' in vast amounts of data... ."); se also Fourth Amendment
Issues Raised by the FBI's 'Carnivore" Program: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on tleJudiriag, 106th Cong. 1 (2000) (statement of
Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Director, Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion) [hereinafterJuly Statement of Donald M. Kerr], available at littp:I, -a,,,.flbi.gov/
congress/congressO0/kerr072400.htm (last visited May 1, 2001) (discussing Carni-
vore's public introduction with Congress). In February 2001, the FBI announced that
the name for the system previously called "Carnivore" would be changed to
"DCS1000, which stands for Digital Collection System, Version 1." Jeff Fick, FBI's Car-
nivore Gets New Name, USA TODAY, Feb. 12, 2001, at B3. For the purposes of this Note,
the name Carnivore will be used to refer to the Carnivore/DCS1000 system.
3 See ILLINOIS INSrTrTTE OF TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH INsTrrTn-, INDEPENDE T RE.
vMV OF THE CAu, womt Sisrts-FINAL REPORT, at iii (2000) [hereinafter IITRI RE.
PORT], available at http://wiv.usdoj.gov/jmd/publications/catmiv_rfinal.pdf (last
visited May 1, 2001); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INE=rSTIOn , FBI PRoGRA.Mts AND INrmL\-
Tr,'S-CARI'voPE DIAGNOSTIC TOOL 1-3 [hereinafter C.ur'uoR DIAGNOSTIC TOOL],
at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/carnivore/carnivore2.htm (last %isited May 1, 2001).
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system is capable of gathering identification information associated
with these activities at two levels. First, in "full collection" mode, Car-
nivore intercepts the addressing information and content of a
targeted user's electronic communication. 4 The Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ) and the FBI assert that Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Tide III), and the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)6 provide the legal authority
for Carnivore's full mode surveillance. 7 Second, in "pen collection"
mode, Camivore primarily gathers only the addressing information
associated with e-mail, web browsing, and file transfer activity., The
DOJ and FBI argue that the "pen register" provisions of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) provide the legal au-
thority for Carnivore's pen mode surveillance. 9
The use of Carnivore in pen mode has been challenged in Con-
gressional hearings, due to apparent inconsistencies between Carni-
vore's pen mode collections and the types of information that may be
collected under pen register authority.10 The DOJ and FBI, however,
4 See IITRI REPORT, supra note 3, at viii, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/
publications/carnivfinal.pd.
5 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
6 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1863 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
7 SeeJuly Statement of Donald M. Kerr, supra note 2, at 2, available at http://
www.fbi.gov/congress/congressOO/kerrO72400.htm. The DOJ and FBI do not rely ol
FISA for pen mode surveillance, though a pen register or trap and trace device may
be deployed pursuant to FISA authority. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1842-1845 (Supp. 1998).
This issue will be discussed in Part II.B.2, Part III.B, and Parts IVA and D.
8 See IITRI REPORT, supra note 3, at ix, available at http://wwv.usdoj.gov/jmd/
publications/carniv__final.pdf.
9 The "Carnivore" Controversy: Electronic Surveillance and Privacy in the Digital Age:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiiary, 106th Cong. 3 (2000) (statement of
Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Director, Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion) [hereinafter September Statement of Donald M. Kerr], available at http://
wNvv.fbi.gov/congress/congress0O/kerrO9O600.htm (last visited May 1, 2001); see alo
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERLY SE(I ION,
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUrTERS AND OBTAINING ELEGarRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS 80-81 (2001), available at http://wvv.cybercrime.gov/searchmauial.
htm (last updated Jan. 10, 2001) (discussing how pen registers and trap and trace
devices operate in traditional deployments and explaining why "[in] Internet
cases ... the distinction is less important"). The pen register section of ECPA is
codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (1994 & Supp. 1998). The IITRI report explains
pen register authority, but then discusses judicial oversight, Carnivore's deployment,
penalties, and exclusionary recourse only in terms of Tide III and FISA. See IITRI
REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-1 to 3-8, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/publica-
tions/carniv_.final.pdf.
10 See Dempsey Statement, supra note 1, at 3, 7, available at http://ivww.cdt.org/
testimony/000906dempsey.shtml; Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the FI's "Carni-
1218 [VOL. 76:,l
NOTE: UNRESTRICTED FEDERAL AGENT
do not detail how the pen register statute governs Carnivore's pen
mode surveillance activities. This Note limits its scope to tie technical
and legal aspects of Carnivore's pen mode operations and concludes
that there is no constitutional impediment to law enforcement offi-
cials deploying Carnivore in pen mode. In addition, contrary to DOJ
and FBI assertions, it determines that the pen register section of ECPA
does not control Carnivore's pen mode surveillance. This Note as-
serts, however, that Carnivore should be used for pure pen mode sur-
veillance only pursuant to pen register authority and proposes the
necessary revisions to the pen register statute to provide for such
authority.
This Note proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief overview of
the Internet infrastructure, the need for Carnivore, and Carnivore's
pen mode surveillance capabilities. Part II reviews the legal environ-
ment. First, it presents the reasonable expectation of privacy test used
to determine whether government actions implicate the Fourth
Amendment. Second, it introduces the relevant statutory scheme
under which Carnivore is deployed for full and pen mode surveil-
lance. Part ImI examines Carnivore's pen mode surveillance against
this legal background. First, it determines that Carnivore's pen mode
vore" Program Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the
Judiciaiy, 106th Cong. 7-13 (2000) (statement of Robert Corn-Revere, Partner at Ho-
gan & Hartson L.L.P., specializing in First Amendment, Internet, and communica-
tions-related issues) [hereinafter Corn-Revere Statement], available at http://
ww.house.gov/judiciary/cornO724.htn (last visited May 1, 2001); Fourth Amendment
Issues Raised by the FBI's "Carnivore" Program: Hearing Before the Subromni. on tle Constitu-
tion of the House Comm. on theJudicia, 106th Cong. 3-5 (2000) (statement of Alan B.
Davidson, Staff Counsel, Center for Democracy and Technology) [hereinafter David-
son Statement], available at http://w%,v.house.go/judiciary/dai0724.litm (last %is-
ited May 1, 2001); Fourth Amendment Issues Raised ly Ihe FBI's "Camitore" Pog-ram:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Contitution of Mle House Comm. on the Judiia!; 106tl
Cong. 7-13 (2000) (statement of Barry Steinhardt, Associate Director, American Civil
Liberties Union) [hereinafter Steinhardt Statement], available at http://
wvv.house.gov/judiciary/steiO724.htm (last visited Ma) 1, 2001); The "Carnivore" Con-
troversy: Electronic Surveillance and Privay in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 2-3 (2000) (statement of Michael O'Neill) [here-
inafter O'Neill Statement], available at http://ww-%.senate.gov/-judiciary/
962000.mo.htm (last visited May 1, 2001); The "Carnivore" Controversy: Electronic Sur-
veillance and Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay,
106th Cong. 2-3 (2000) (statement of Jeffrey Rosen, Associate Professor, George
Washington University Law School) [hereinafter Rosen Statement], available at http:/
/www.senate.gov/-judiciary/962000..jr.htm (last visited May 1, 2001). The HouseJu-
diciary Committee recently acknowledged that "the authority for [the use of pen reg-
isters to obtain e-mail addresses sent and received] is not without doubL" H.R. REP.
No. 106-932, at n.10 (2000), available at ftp://ftp.loc.gov/pub/tlom es/cplO6/
hr932.txt (last visited May 1, 2001).
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capabilities do not infringe on a reasonable expectation of privacy and
thus neither implicate nor violate the Fourth Amendment. Second, it
determines that such capabilities are not governed by the require-
ments and prohibitions of the pen register section of ECPA. Part III
proposes revisions to the statute that both encompass the use of Carni-
vore for pen mode surveillance and allow for developments in com-
munications and surveillance technologies. This Note concludes with
a call for Congressional review of the pen register statute and enact-
ment of the recommendations contained in this Note.
I. THE INTERNET AND CARNIVORE
A. The Internet Infrastructure
What computer users around the world identify as the "Internet"
evolved from the United States Department of Defense's information
sharing system called the Advanced Research Project Agency Network
(ARPANET)."1 The modern Internet, much like the original
ARPANET, is "a network of computers that are connected so they can
exchange information amongst each other."12 Today's computer
users rely on the Internet to facilitate different forms of communica-
tion and information exchange including e-mail, 13 web browsing, and
file transfer activity.14
11 See Robert S. Steere, Note, Keeping "Private E-mail" Private: A Proposal to Modify
the Electronic Communications Privac. Act, 33 VAL. U. L. REv. 231, 246, 246-47 n.89
(1998) (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 2d 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
12 EricJ. Sinrod & William P. Reilly, Cyber-crimes: A Practical Approach to the Applica-
tion of Federal Computer Crime Laws, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HiGoi T"IcH. L.J. 177,
190 (2000); see also Steere, supra note 11, at 246-47 n.89. Mssrs. Sinrod and Reilly
provide an excellent summary of how the Internet is structured and how it operates.
Their article was particularly helpful for this Section of this Note.
13 E-mail is "a system that lets people send and receive messages with their com-
puters. The [e-mail] system might be over a company's own intraoffice [sic] network
or over an external network such as [the] Internet." MICHAEL D. Scorr, INTrPrNE &
TECHNOLOGY LAW DESK REFERENCE 424 (1995). The typical e-mail message contains
the sender and recipient e-mail addresses (for example, TO: student@nd.edu, FROM:
professor@nd.edu), a subject header, the date, and the message content. SeeJmiuv
LAWSON, THE COMPLETE INTERNET HANDBOOK FOR LWYERs 29-30 (1999). E-mail
messages also may include attached files that can be opened by the recipient. See id.
at 37-38.
14 Web browsing and file transfer activity both entail seeking and obtaining com-
munication and content on the Internet via a web browser like Netscape Navigator or
Internet Explorer. See ScoTr, supra note 13, at 536. Web browsers locate documents
using an address called a "Uniform Resource Locator" (URL) and display documents
in "hypertext markup language" (HTML). Id. at 536-37. The URL is "different than
an e-mail address .... [It] is a reference to a particular file." Id. at 521. URLs
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For an exchange of information between two computers, one
computer, the "client," requests information from another computer,
the "server."15 This communication process is facilitated by the Trans-
mission Control Protocol (TCP) and the Internet Protocol (IP), col-
lectively the TCP/IP.' 6 When the server receives a request for a file
from the client, it "locates the file on its computer and breaks the file
into tiny pieces... [and wraps these pieces] in a bundle of instruc-
tions that tells [them] where to go ... called 'packets.'"17
The TCP assigns a sequence number... so it can track what it has
sent and eliminate the need to duplicate sending the same packet
twice unless the packet is lost somewhere along the line to the cli-
ent. The "packet header," contains the sequence numbers that also
tells the client the next sequence number to expect after each
packet, so the client can start arranging the packets and conduct a
rolling inventory.' 8
The Internet Protocol "route[s] the packets across the Internet," be-
tween the server and client, and does so using "many other servers to
reach its final destination."' 9 The IP assigns a numerical address to
identify the server on which the information sought is located, and the servers "are
linked to the Internet through [ ] common communications protocol[s], known as
hypertext transfer protocol ('HTrP') [and File Transfer Protocol ('FTP')1." Id. at
536-37. The URL consists of three parts: (1) the protocol (http:// or ftp:!!), (2) the
domain at which the file resides (for example, wwv.nd.edu), and (3) the specific path
to the file (for example, basketball/women/2001nationalchampions.html). Id. at
521. "[A]n URL will direct a user to a file with a particular protocol, location, and
name on a particular server, but it does not assure a user that the named file at a
particular location is the same file that earlier was at the same location [or x-hat the
user thinks they are going to find]." Id.
15 Sinrod & Reilly, supra note 12, at 190.
16 See id. at 191. E-mail is typically transferred between computers via the In-
ternet using a subset of the TCP/IP family of protocols, the Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol (SMTP). See Steere, supra note 11, at 247 & n.93.
17 Sinrod & Reilly, supra note 12, at 191. "A 'packet' is a brief computer message
of perhaps a few thousand bits (up to a thousand or so characters) containing some
indication of the source of the message and the destination in addition to the con-
tent" The "Carnivore" Controversy: Eledronic Su'eilliance and Privacy in the Digital Age:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on theJudidawy, 106th Cong. 2 (2000) (statement of Dr.
Vimton G. Cerf, Internet Trustee, The Internet Society), available at http://
ww.senate.gov/-judiciary/962000_vgc.htm (last visited May 1, 2001). Dr. Cerf com-
pares Internet packet-svitch communication to sending a book through the mail but
doing so using post cards, with the cards numbered for re-ordering and for informing
the sender of missing cards. See id. at 2-3.
18 Sinrod & Reilly, supra note 12, at 191.
19 Id. M ssrs. Sinrod and Reilly analogize IP addresses to zip codes.
Each computer on the Internet has an IP address that tells [other] com-
puters where [it] is located. The IP address is very similar to a zip code. For
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every packet before they are sent, "hoping the packet arrives Where it
is supposed to go. If the server does not receive a response that the
packet was received [by the client], the IP can send an error message
to the client ... letting the client know that the packet did not get
there."20 This process continues until the server receives a response
from the client for every packet that the server has sent. While this
may seem time consuming, the process actually takes only a very small
fraction of a second and is virtually seamless to the user.21
B. The Need for Carnivore
According to the FBI, "The Nation's communications networks
are routinely used in the commission of serious criminal activities. '22
The FBI intends to use Carnivore to combat the various criminal acts
that occur via the Internet and "threaten the security of our Nation
and the safety of our people."23 The FBI asserts that it needs Carni-
vore, because existing technologies-whether available to the FBI or
owned and operated by an Internet Service Provider (ISP)-are inca-
pable of satisfying the limitations on information interceptions im-
posed by existing federal law. 24 In some situations, particularly
example, a zip code that begins with a 9, belongs to an address located on
the west coast of the United States. If the next number is a 4, the location is
in the San Francisco area, and so on until the precise region is located.
However, to parallel the IP addresses, each house in the zip code area would
be assigned a number, instead of an address.
Id.
20 Id.
21 See Steere, supra note 11, at 247 n.93 (making this assertion regarding e-mail),
22 CQiuvoP. DIAGNOSTic TOOL, supra note 3, at 1, at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/
lab/carnivore/camivore2.htm. "In recent years, the FBI has encountered an increas-
ing number of criminal investigations in which the criminal subjects use the Internet
to communicate with each other or to communicate with their victims." Id.
23 September Statement of Donald M. Kerr, supra note 9, at 1, available at http://
wvw.fbi.gov/congress/congress0O/kerrO9O600.htm. The FBI lists terrorism, espio-
nage, information warfare, hacking, child pornography and sexual exploitation of
children, fraud, and other serious and violent crimes as the acts that "threaten the
security of our Nation and the safety of our people" and justify the deployment of
Carnivore. See id. at 1-3.
24 Id. at 4 (stating that commercial tools that are similar to Carnivore worked "as
well as could be expected ... [but] had never been designed as a law enforcement
electronic surveillance tool, and hence had shortcomings"); see also CARNIvOPL DIA-
NOSTiC TOOL, supra note 3, at 2. "[Tihe complexity of modern communications net-
works, like the Internet, and the complexity of modern users' communications
demand better discrimination than older analog communications." July Statement of
Donald M. Kerr, supra note 2, at 4, available at http://wvv.fbi.gov/congress/con-
gress00/kerrO72400.htm.
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"where more stringent legal, evidentiary, and law enforcement re-
quirements exist," the FBI asserts that commerciall)-available tools
"colect either too much information... or, alternatively, fail to col-
lect the authorized information at aU." The Government maintains
that Carnivore will be installed only when the FBI and an ISP have
determined that the ISP's system is incapable of properly complying
with the court order.26
C. The Carnivore System
In response to privacy concerns about the use of Carnivore, '- 7 the
DOJ asked the Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute
(IUTRI) to conduct an independent review of the system. That review
culminated in the December 2000 release of a report on Carnivore's
technical capabilities. 28 Almost concurrently, pursuant to Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) requests and a subsequent court order, the
DOJ and the FBI released the first installment of documents relating
to the Carnivore system.2 9 These materials will serve as the primary
basis for understanding exactly what the Carnivore system is, what it is
expected to do, and what it actually accomplishes' ?
25 September Statement of Donald M. Kerr, supra note 9, at 7-8, at'ailable at
http://N"%iv.fbi.gov/congress/congress00/kerr090600.htm.
26 See id. at 6.
27 See Corn-Revere Statement, supra note 10, at 8, available at http://"wvw.mhouse.
gov/judiciary/corn0724.htm; Davidson Statement, supra note 10, at 3-7, available at
http://vwv.house.gov/judiciary/daiO724.htm; Dempsey Statement, supra note 1, at
6, available at http://wiv%%.cdLorg/testimony/000906dempsey.shtml; Steinhardt State-
ment, supra note 10, at 1-5, 7-9, available at http://ww%%v.house.gov/judiciary/
stei0724.htm.
28 See IlTRI REPORT, supra note 3, available at http://www%.usdoj.gov/jmd/publi-
cations/carniv-final.pdf.
29 See Avww.epic.org/privacy/carnivore/foiadocuments.html (last visited May 1,
2001).
30 The FBI documents released by the DOJ and the FBI pursuant to the FOIA
request are merely the first two installments (roughly 400 pages) of the nearly 3000
pages the government maintains on the Carnivore s)stem. See id. The FBI plans addi-
tional releases every forty-five days until all 3000 documents have been released, how-
ever, for security purposes the government has redacted significant portions of the
released documents and presently is editing the to-be-released documents for future
release. See Press Release, Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), FII Rleases
Carnivore Documents to EPIC Privaty Group Says Disclosure Insfidient (Oct. 2, 2000).
available at http://wiv.epic.org/privacy/carnivore/foia-pr.litml (last isited May 1,
2001). As of April 2001, EPIC has not posted a third installment of FOIA documents,
assuming the DOJ and FBI have released such documents.
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1. The Carnivore Architecture
According to the IITRI report, "Carnivore is a software-based tool
used to examine all Internet Protocol (IP) packets on an Ethernet'-
and record only those packets or packet segments that meet very spe-
cific requirements."3 2 The Carnivore system architecture is comprised
of:
(1) a one-way tap into an Ethernet data [stream];331 (2) a general
purpose computer to filter and collect data [i.e., the collection com-
puter];[341 (3) one or more additional general purpose computers
to control the collection and examine the data [i.e., the remote
computer(s)]; (4) a [Carnivore-dedicated] telephone link to con-
31 Ethernet is a kind of network "that is fast and cheap but limited to a total
distance of less than a mile." JOHN R. LEVINE & CAROL BAROUDI, THE INTERNiT FOR
DuMMIEs 25 (2d ed. 1994). "[A] computer is connected to the Ethernet by a... cable
known as a drop cable...." Id. It is "[a] wire that looks much like a phone wire with
the familiar phone jack... [that] plugs into the back of your computer." hM. at 27. A
modem, on the other hand, "enables data from one computer to travel to another
computer by using ordinary telephone lines." Id. at 17; see also ALLEN C. BENSON, Tune
COMPLETE INTExRNET COMPANION FOR LiBRARiANs 33-46 (1995) (comparing dial-up In-
ternet connections to direct communications); JOHN BuRKE, LEUNING THE Ir ERNET
4 (1996) (comparing directly-connected Internet activity to dial-up connections via
modem); LAwsON, supra note 13, at 426, 429-30 (defining Ethernet, local area net-
works, and modems); Scorr, supra note 13, at 184, 302, 325-26 (same).
32 IITRI REPORT, supra note 3, at vii, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/ptb-
lications/carniv-final.pdf.
33 In a typical Carnivore installation,
an existing Ethernet data line is disconnected from an Ethernet hub or
switch and plugged into the tap. A new line is run from port B [of the tap]
to the hub/switch. The tap passes the traffic along [these lines] as if it were
a standard cable... [while taking] a copy of the ... data in each direction
and feed[ing] it ... [into Carnivore via a second hub].
Id. at 3-10 to 3-11. The cabling process and the types of cables used ensure that
"Carnivore is in a receive-only mode. The transmission lines from the Ethernet
adapter are not connected to anything inside the tap." Id. at 3-11.
34 "Carnivore employs a generic Pentium-class PC, with a generic 10/100 Mbps
Ethernet adapter... [and a] removableJaz disk." Id. at 3-11 to 3-12. The collection
computer is installed without a keyboard or monitor and is normally controlled re-
motely. See id. at 3-12. "A case agent controlling the Carnivore collection computer
from an external computer.., can ... start[ ] or stop[ ] collection and download[ ]
collected data. An additional password is required to access the advanced setup fea-
tures and change the filter settings." Id. at 3-13. During deployments, the Carnivore
collection computer "might not be physically accessible to case agents." Id. at 3-12.
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nect the [remote] computer(s) to the collection computer,31' and
(5) Carnivore software 3 6
FBI technicians work with ISP personnel to connect the collection
computer on the smallest subset of the ISP's network that ensures
monitoring and interception of all of the targeted user's communica-
tions, in accordance with the court order authorizing the surveillance,
while minimizing exposure to other users' communication.3 7
2. The Software Program and Filtering Process
Carnivore is actually the name of the collection sofm-are program
that filters and records IP packets.ss The Carnivore software is one
component of the "Dragonware Suite," which includes the commer-
cially-available Packeteer and CoolMiner software that reconstruct e-
mail and other Internet traffic from the collected packets.39 Pack-
eteer reconstructs the TCP session from the collected IP packets and
creates files that can be viewed using CoolMiner.40 The FBI case
agent conducting the surveillance can use CoolMiner to selectively
view certain types of packets; "[the agent first might waunt to look at
the HTTP [web browsing] traffic and then later look at the e-mail
traffic. By using CoolMiner, the agent doesn't have to look at every-
thing at one time."41
Once the Carnivore software is installed on the collection com-
puter, the case agent dials into the system from a remote computer to
instruct the collection computer to start and stop collection, cause the
collection to start recording to a new file, download the collected
data, and change filter preferences. 42 Depending on what the court
order authorizes, Carnivore can be programmed to conduct several
different types of filtering. "The simplest form of collection is one
35 The telephone line is an analog voice line that is "installed especially for the
Carnivore deployment. It does not use one of the modems from tie ISP's modem
pool, nor is it controllable via the Internet." Id. at 3-12. "[E]ach Carnivore [collec-
tion] computer is equipped with an off-the-shelf 56-kbps modem allowing it to com-
municate [with a remote computer] via a standard analog telephone link." Id.
"[T]he telephone line is protected by an electronic key- only a remote computer with
a matching key can connect to [the collection computer]." Id.
36 Id. at 3-10.
37 See id- at 3-9 to 3-10.
38 See id. at 313.
39 See id at 3-17.
40 See id. at 3-17 to 3-18.
41 Id. at 3-18.
42 See id. at 3-12. Filter preferences are changed on an ad-anced screen, access to
which requires an additional password. Id. at 3-13.
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based on [the targeted user's] fixed IP address."45 When the targeted
user's computer does not have a fixed IP address, "Carnivore supports
the collection of dynamically-allocated IP addresses .... -,4 Carnivore
can also filter based on the targeted user's e-mail address t5 or ex-
change protocol-the latter is only used in conjunction with other
filters.46 When operating in full collection mode only, Carnivore can
also intercept communication based on specific text strings. 47
43 Id. at 3-14.
44 Id. at 3-15. Dynamically-allocated IP addresses are addresses that are assigned
as the targeted user logs on to the ISP network's Ethernet with a laptop computer-
the IP address assigned to the targeted user's computer may change each time the
user connects to the network. See id. To monitor and record dynamically-assigned IP
addresses, the government agent must know the access control address of the ma-
chine, the user name, and a range of IP addresses from which the IP address may be
dynamically assigned. See id.
45 Id. at 3-16. "Carnivore can filter [e-mail] traffic based upon the e-mail address,
The proper mode must be selected and the e-mail address to be monitored must be
entered. If [e-mail] ports are selected and no e-mail address is input, Carnivore col-
lects all packets for those ports." Id.; see also id. at 3-15, fig. 3-3 (Carnivore Advanced
Menu).
46 See id. at 3-15. For protocol filtering, Carnivore "can be set to full, pen, or
none [the default setting] .... If [the default setting] is selected, no packets for that
protocol are collected." Id. at 3-15 to 3-16. These ports for protocol filtering include,
but are not limited to, 110 (POP3, e-mail), 20 (file transfer data), 21 (file transfer
control), 25 (SMTP, e-mail), and 80 (HTTP, web browsing). See id. at 3-15, fig. 3-3
(Carnivore Advanced Menu). In pen mode, Carnivore "only collects address informa-
tion appropriate for the protocol (for example, FROM and TO fields of SMTP e-mail
or IP address for FTP [file transfer] and HTTP [web browsing] traffic)." Id. at 3-15.
No packets are collected if Carnivore cannot detect address-only information. Id,
"Carnivore [also] collects the packets associated with the content of the collected
communications, but replaces the actual data with Xs." Id. From this information,
CoolMiner can "report byte counts for the ... sessions, even for pen mode collec-
tions .... [T]he byte counts for the various fields of a protocol (such as Subject) can
[also] be determined." Id. at 3-15 to 3-16.
47 Id. at 3-16. "For example, a setting could be made to collect all TCP packets
from a specific IP address that contains [a particular text string]. There is also an
option to collect the entire TCP transmission for any packet that contains the given
text string." Id. "Text filtering capability allows the FBI to capture web-based e-mail
such as Hotmail. For example, Carnivore can be set to filter HTTP packets looking
for the string '&login=usemame' where username represents the target of the court
order." Id. Because text filtering occurs only in full collect mode and thus only oc-
curs pursuant to a Title III or FISA order, it will not be examined in the remainder of
this Note. Nonetheless, it seems prudent to provide some information about this ca-
pability for informational purposes.
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3. Laboratory Tests
In order to fully consider Carnivore's capabilities, IHTRI uns
asked to conduct laboratory test cases of Carnivore in operation 48
ITRI conducted thirteen separate tests; five tested Carnivore in typi-
cal collection cases, while eight tested Carnivore's general capabili-
ties.49 However, only three of the test cases involved pen mode
surveillance. 50 Because this Note only examines Carnivore's pen
mode surveillance, the following summary of the test cases uill be lim-
ited to those wherein Carnivore was set for pen mode collection.
These test cases provide insight into precisely what information Carni-
vore gathers when operating in pen mode-an issue relevant to the
analysis of the constitutional and statutory questions addressed in Part
mI.
a. Non-content E-mail Collection
The test of non-content e-mail collection envisions a scenario
where "[a] court order authorizes collecting the noncontent [sic]
header fields on e-mail messages sent to and from the target; it
[would] not permit collecting the SUBJECT header or the body [con-
tent] of the e-mail traffic."5' IITRI conducted this test to "[v] erify that
Carnivore ...collect[s] [only] the e-mail addresses that were sent
from and to a target, and does not collect any of the target's e-mafl
subject and content."5 2 This test showed that Carnivore did not col-
lect any information other than TO and FROM addressing informa-
tion of the targeted user's e-mail activity, but in some trials failed to
48 The tests are as follows: (1) Non-content E-mail Collection, (2) Non-content
Web Browsing Collection, (3) Non-content File Transfer Activity Collection; (4) Full
Collection on a Fixed IP Address, (5) E-mail Content Collecuon, (6) Alias E-mail
Collection, (7) Filtering Text String on Web Activity Collection, (8) Power Failure
and Restoration, (9) Full Mode Collection for All TCP Ports, (10) Collect from a
DHCP Assigned IP Address, (11) Filtering on Text String for E-mail Collection, (12)
Filtering on Text String and E-mail Address or E-mail UserID for E-mail Collection,
(13) Filtering on Text String for FTP Collection. See id. at 3-23 to 3-28, C-1 to C-32.
49 See id. at 3-23. The three tests of pen mode surveillance are (1) Non-content E-
mail Collection, (2) Non-content Web Browsing Collection, (3) Non-content File
Transfer Activity Collection. See id. at 3-24 to 3-25, C-1 to C-9; infra Part 1.3.a-c.
50 Tests 1 to 3 are the pen mode tests, while tests 4 to 13 are full collection mode.
See id. at 3-23 to 3-28.
51 Id. at C-1.
52 Id. at 3-24. This test should "verify that Carnivore does collect and preserve all
of the information authorized by the court order and that no other system user's
communication can be collected." Id at C-1.
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collect even this information. 53 However, IlTRI noted that when op-
erating in pen mode, "Carnivore replaces e-mail header information
with Xs. When this data is viewed in CoolMiner it is easy to determine
the length of each field in the header and the length of the entire
message. - 4 Thus, although the IITRI test verified that, when operat-
ing in pen mode, Carnivore does not collect any content or header
information, it may reveal the size of the header and message.
b. Non-content Web Browsing Collection
The test of non-content web browsing collection envisions a sce-
nario where "[a] court authorizes collecting source and destination
information for HTTP [web browsing] activities by [the targeted
user]."55 Specifically, the order would authorize collecting the IP ad-
dress of the server from which the targeted user seeks to retrieve infor-
mation. The order would not authorize collecting the full Uniform
Resource Locator (URL) generated by the user's browsing activity,
which may have specific search terms or other information embedded
in it.-6 The purpose of this test is "[t]o verify that Carnivore collects
and preserves all of the target's HTTP connection information au-
thorized by the court order, only that information, and not other
users' web browsing source and destination information or content."5 7
53 Id. at 3-24. IITRI noted that Carnivore "[clannot effectively collect POP3 e-
mail messages in pen mode. It has insufficient capacity to separate allowed versus
forbidden information from the messages. It, therefore, collects nothing.... ." Id. at
4-8.
54 Id. at C-3.
55 Id. at C-4.
56 See id. Web browsers locate documents using an address called a "Uniform
Resource Locator" (URL). See Scor, supra note 13, at 536-37. The URL is "a refer-
ence to a particular file." Id. at 521. URLs identify the server on which the informa-
tion sought is located and consist of three parts: (1) the protocol (http:// or ftp://),
(2) the domain at which the file resides (for example, www.nd.edu), and (3) the
specific path to the file (for example, basketball/women/2001naionalcham-
pions.html). Id. The full URL may have privacy components the interception of
which would require greater authority than the pen register statute could provide.
For illustrations of this concern, see Davidson Statement, sura note 10, at 5-6, availa-
ble at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/davi0724.htm; Dempsey Statement, supra note
1, at 6-8, available at http://www.cdt.org/testimony/000906dempsey.shtml; Stein-
hardt Statement, supra note 10, at 7-8, available at http://wivw.house.gov/judiciary/
stei0724.htm.
57 IITRI REPORT, supra note 3, at C4, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/
publications/carniv_final.pdf. This test should "[v]erify that Carnivore does collect
the target's HTTP web browsing activity source and destination IP address, does not
collect the URL [or] content of the target's web activities, and does not collect other
users' communication." Id. at 3-24.
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This test indicated that Carnivore only collected the source and desti-
nation IP addressing information of the targeted user's web browsing
activity.58 Like the non-content e-mail collection test discussed above,
however, "[t]he CoolMiner analysis results... provide information on
how many bytes are transferred between the client and the server
[and that] data sizes can also be counted from the Carnivore raw
data."59
c. Non-content File Transfer Activity Collection
The test of non-content file transfer activity collection envisions a
scenario where "[a] court order authorizes collecting source and des-
tination information for FTP [file transfer protocol] activity by [a
targeted user]. Specifically, the order [would authorize] collecting
the IP address to which [the targeted user] opens an FTP connec-
tion."60 The purpose of this test is "[t]o verify that Carnivore collects
and preserves all of the target's inbound and outbound FTP traf-
fic ... information authorized by the court order, only that informa-
tion, and not other users' FTP source and destination information or
content."61 This test showed that Carnivore intercepted and recorded
"only the connections of FTP activities from and to the target ..... G2
In other words, it only collected the source and destination IP ad-
dresses associated with the targeted user's file transfer activity. How-
ever, as in the previous two test cases, "[t]he CoolMiner
analysis... [indicates] how many bytes are transferred between the
client and the server."
63
58 See id. at C-5. Carnivore intercepted and recorded "only the activities of web
browsing performed from the target's... computer.... [N]one of the web browsing
content or URL were collected; only the client and server HTrP connection informa-
tion was collected." Id.
59 Id. IITRI noted that "[r]ecording this information might be an issue of over-
collecting because the court order only authorizes collecting the IP addresses of web
activity, but none of the information on data size can be collected." Id.
60 Id. at C-7.
61 Id. This test should "[v]erilin that Carnivore does collect the target's file
downloading activity source and destination IP address and does not collect the file
content and other users' FTP activities." Id. at 3-24.
62 Id. at C-8.
63 Id. TRI noted that "[r]ecording this information might be an issue of over-
collecting because the court order only authorizes collecting the IP addresses of
source and destination, but none of the information on message size can be col-
lected." Id. at C-9.
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I. THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
As noted above, the DOJ and the FBI claim that the pen register
section of ECPA provides the authority for law enforcement officials
to gather information through Carnivore's pen mode surveillance. A
pen register order, however, is not the equivalent of the warrant the
Fourth Amendment requires when law enforcement officials conduct
a search or seizure. The use of Carnivore in pen collection mode,
therefore, raises two legal issues: first, whether the collection of cer-
tain information in the absence of a full court-approved warrant vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment; and second, whether the pen register
statute provides the authority to operate Carnivore in pen mode. This
Part provides the background necessary to understand the legal impli-
cations of Carnivore's pen mode surveillance discussed in Part 11.
A. The Fourth Amendment Expectation of Privacy Test
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches
and seizures.6 4 The text indicates that the law specifically protects
persons, houses, papers, and effects, 6 5 and it requires the government
to obtain a warrant before conducting a search or seizure. 66 To impli-
cate the Fourth Amendment, however, government activity must rise
to the level of either a search or a seizure,6 7 which means that it must
invade a person's reasonable expectation of privacy.68 To constitute
such an invasion, government action must infringe on an individual's
actual or subjective expectation of privacy that is also "one that society
is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' 69
64 SeeJOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PIUNGI.
PLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 82 (1999); STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIELJ. CAPP,%,
AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 36 (1996).
65 The full text of the Fourth Amendment reads,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
66 See DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 64, at 82; SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note
64, at 36.
67 See SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 64, at 36.
68 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
69 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring)). The Court stated that this was similar to inquiring
"whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual's expectation, viewed ob-
jectively, is 'justifiable' under the circumstances." Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 353),
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The Supreme Court first applied this Fourth Amendment expec-
tation of privacy test to pen registers in Smnitlh v. Maryland.70 In Smith,
a telephone company installed a pen register, at police request, to
"record the numbers dialed from the telephone at [Michael Lee
Smith's] home."71 Smith argued that use of the pen register violated
the Fourth Amendment because the police failed to obtain a warrant
or court order prior to having the pen register installed.72 In re-
sponse to this claim, the Court stated that "pen registers do not ac-
quire the contents of communications ... '[and] a law enforcement
officer could not even determine from the use of a pen register
whether a communication existed." 73 The Court doubted that tele-
phone users "entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the num-
bers they dial," because they transmit these numbers to the telephone
company to complete calls and realize that phone companies use
technology, including pen registers, for billing purposes.74 Further-
more, "even if [Smith] did harbor some subjective expectation [of pri-
vacy], this expectation is not 'one that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable'... [because] a person has no legitimate expectation of
70 442 U.S. 735 (1979). The Supreme Court's previous pen register decision,
United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), addressed w hetler Rule
41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes the issuance of a
warrant to search for and seize specified types of property, was sufficiently broad to
include as a seizure the telephone dial impulses recorded by pen registers. See id. at
160.
71 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. In Smith, the Supreme Court defined a pen register as
"'a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring
the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released. It does not
overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are actually com-
pleted.'" Id. at 736 n.1 (quoting N.Y. TeL Co., 434 U.S. at 161 n.1 (holding that Rule
41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is sufficiently broad to include pen
register recordings as seizable property)). In 1986, Congress enacted the pen register
section of ECPA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (1994 & Supp. 1998), which defines a pen
register under existing law. See id. § 3127(3). This statute does not, however, alter
the importance of Smith and its progeny for analyzing the Fourth Amendment impli-
cations of the Carnivore system.
72 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
73 Id. at 741 (quoting N.Y. TeL Co., 434 U.S. at 167). The Court further stated:
"These devices do not hear sound. They disclose only the telephone num-
bers that have been dialed-a means of establishing communication.
Neither the purport of any communication between the caller and the recip-
ient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is
disclosed by the pen register."
Id. (quoting NY. TeL Co., 434 U.S. at 167).
74 Id. at 742.
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privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties." 75
The Court's holding in Smith will be useful when examining the con-
stitutional aspects of Carnivore's pen mode surveillance in Part III.A.
B. The Relevant Statutory Scheme
As indicated, Congress has enacted several statutes addressing
surveillance of communication. For purposes of this Note, the rele-
vant statutes are Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 (Title III),76 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 (FISA), 7 7 and the pen register section of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) .78 The DOJ and FBI as-
sert that Title III and FISA provide the authority for Carnivore's full
collection surveillance, while the pen register section of ECPA pro-
vides the authority to use Carnivore for pen mode surveillance. 71- This
Note presents the relevant aspects of each of these statutes, but only
challenges the propriety of the asserted pen register authority.
1. Title III and FISA
According to the Government, Tide III and FISA are only relied
on for authority to use Carnivore in full collection mode to acquire
the contents of e-mail, web browsing, and file transfer activity. None-
theless, an understanding of what these statutes authorize is worth-
while background information for understanding the FBI's use of
Carnivore pursuant to pen register authority to collect non-content
information associated with these activities.
a. Title III
Title III is a comprehensive statute covering the subject of wire
and electronic surveillance. The statute generally prohibits inten-
tional interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications,9' but
allows for law enforcement interception of such communication pur-
75 Id. at 743-44 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). By
using his telephone, Smith "voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the tele-
phone company and 'exposed' that information to [the company's] equipment in the
ordinary course of business. In so doing, [Smith] assumed the risk that the company
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed." Id. at 744.
76 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
77 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1863 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
78 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
79 See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
80 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1994).
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suant to a court order.8' According to Title III, "intercept" is defined
to mean the "acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or
oral communication."82
To acquire a court order authorizing the interception of elec-
tronic communication under Title M,83 "[a] ny attorney for the Gov-
ernment may authorize application to a federal judge of competent
jurisdiction... [for] an order authorizing or approving the intercep-
tion of electronic communications... when such interception may
provide or has provided evidence of [any federal felony]."8 4 Title I
requires that an application for an intercept order be "made in writ-
ing upon oath or affirmation" and state the relevant necessary infor-
mation to support such an application. 5 The judge may enter an
81 See i. § 2516 (1994 & Supp. 1998). The statute also provides for the warrant-
less interception of such information under exigent circumstances (danger of death
or serious physical injury to a person, national security, organized crime conspiracy).
See i. § 2518(7) (1994).
82 Id § 2510(4) ("'[llntercept' means the aural or olier acquisition of ie con-
tents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any elec-
tronic, mechanical, or other device .... ."). "Electronic communication" is defined in
Tide Il to mean
any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of
any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoeletronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign com-
merce but does not include
(A) any wire or oral communication;
(B) any communication made through a tone-only paging device;
(C) any communication from a tracking device (as defined in section
3117 of this tide); or
(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institu-
tion in a communication system used for the electronic storage
and transfer of funds ....
I. § 2510(12) (Supp. 1998).
83 Because Carnivore only intercepts electronic communication, the remainder
of this discussion concerning Title III applications will address only those Title III
provisions that involve the interception of electronic communication.
84 Id. § 2516(3) (1994). For interception of an electronic communication under
Title Ill, the statute permits any attorney for the Government to authorize the appli-
cation by listing any Federal felony, see id., while for interception of a wire or oral
communication the application must come from one of a listed group ofJustice De-
partment attorneys or the principal state prosecutor and must indicate a felony from
a certain enumerated list, see i. § 2516(1)-(2).
85 Id. § 2518(1). The application shall identify the investigative or law enforce-
ment officers both making and authorizing the application for a Title IlI order. Sre
id. In addition, the application must state the facts justifying the application includ-
ing the offense involved, the place where the interception ill take place, the type of
communication sought to be intercepted, the identity of the person committing die
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted, see id. § 2518(1) (b), and
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order authorizing the intercept only after determining probable cause
exists regarding the individual involved, the relationship between the
communication to be intercepted and the accused offense, and the
appropriateness of the facilities to be targeted or used to intercept the
communication.8 6 If the judge finds probable cause, the order au-
thorizing the interception of electronic communication must specify
the identity, if known, of the person targeted by the surveillance, the
facilities to be used, and the time period for interception.8 7 The or-
der may direct the provider of the electronic communication service
to assist the applicant in completing the surveillance and inter-
ception.88
b. FISA
FISA permits federal agents to conduct electronic surveillance in
order to monitor and retain information that is "evidence of a
crime,"89 provided that special district and appellate court judges de-
termine "there is probable cause to believe that... the target of the
electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power."90 FISA defines electronic surveillance to mean the acquisi-
"whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." Id.
§ 2518(1) (c). The applicant must also disclose any previous applications for such an
order "known to the individual authorizing and making the application," id.
§ 2518(1) (e), and the success or failure of such application, when it would involve the
same persons, facilities, or places as the present application. See id. Furthermore, the
applicant may be required by the judge to furnish additional information in support
of the application. See id. § 2518(2).
86 See id. § 2518(1). Thejudge must also determine that probable cause exists as
to the inadequacy of other investigative methods. See id. § 2518(3) (c).
87 See id. § 2518(4). The order must also particularly describe "the type of com-
munication sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to
which it relates," id. § 2518(4) (c), "the identity of the agency authorized to intercept
the communications, and of the person authorizing the application," § 2518(4) (d),
and "whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the commu-
nication has been first obtained." Id. § 2518(4) (e).
88 See id. § 2518(4). An "electronic communication service" is defined as "any
service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic
communications." Id. § 2510(15).
89 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(3) (1994); see2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ETAL., CRIMINAL PROCx-
DURE § 4.3(d), at 365 & n.105 (2d ed. 1999).
90 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (a) (3) (A); see 2 LAFAvE Er AL., supra note 89, at 364. The Act
requires the ChiefJustice of the United States to designate several district and circuit
court judges to review petitions for electronic surveillance of foreign powers or an
agent of a foreign power. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)-(b); see also 2 LFAvt' Er AL., sulpra
note 89, at 364-65 & n.103. FISA does not altogether preclude surveillance of United
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tion of either the contents of wire or radio communication or "infor-
mation, other than from a wire or radio communication, under
circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement pur-
poses."9' FISA also permits the President, acting through the
Attorney General, to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance "to
acquire foreign intelligence information,"92 if the Attorney General
certifies that the surveillance will acquire only "the contents of com-
munication transmitted by a means used exclusively between or
among foreign powers."93
FISA also permits the use of pen registers and trap and trace de-
vices for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investiga-
tions conducted by the FBI.94 FISA allows for installation of a pen
register or trap and trace device on a telephone line or a "communica-
tion instrument or device."95 While the DOJ and FBI assert that Car-
nivore is only used pursuant to FISA for full mode surveillance, it
appears statutorily permissible to use it for pen mode surveillance as
well. However, FISA refers to the pen register section of ECPA for
States persons when they are acting as agents of a foreign power. Sfe 50 U.S.C.
§ 1801 (b) (2); 2 IAFAVE 'r ExAt_, supra note 89, at 365 & n.107-08. United States per-
sons include U.S. citizens, permanent resident aliens, unincorporated associations
comprised of U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens, or U.S. corporations, "but
does not include a corporation or association which is a foreign power." 50 U.S.C.
§ 1801(i); see 2 LAFANE Er AL., supra note 89, at 365 n.107. FISA does not permit
monitoring a US person solely because of the person's First Amendment actiities.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (3) (A); 2 LOF.Av' ET At., supra note 89, at 365.
91 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(4). Contents of communications means "any information
concerning the identity of the parties to such communication or te existence, sub-
stance, purport, or meaning of that communication." Id. § 1801(n). Wire communi-
cation is defined as "any communication while it is being carried by a uire, cable, or
other like connection furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common
carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or
foreign communications." Id. § 1801(1).
92 Id. § 1802(a)(1); see 2 LFAV ET A.t-, supra note 89, at 365.
93 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a) (1) (A); see2 L,,Fswu ErxtL, supra note 89, at 365. A copy of
the Attorney General's certification, given in writing under oath, is transmitted under
seal to the special courts outlined above. See50 U.S.C. § 1802(a) (3); 2 LF,\ Er tAL.,
supra note 89, at 365.
94 50 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1) (Supp. 1998). The process for obtaining an order to
install a pen register or trap and trace device under FISA is substantially similar to the
process under the pen register section of ECPA. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1842(b)-(d)
(application and issuance under FISA), with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3122-3123 (1994) (applica-
tion and issuance under the pen register section of ECPA).
95 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (3).
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definitions of pen register and trap and trace device. 96 Because Carni-
vore does not constitute either of these devices under the present pen
register statute, as this Note asserts, 97 the use of Carnivore in pen
mode is neither authorized nor constrained by the provisions of FISA.
Accordingly, this Note reserves further discussion of this issue to the
analysis below.
2. The Pen Register Section of ECPA
As stated, the DOJ and FBI assert that the pen register section of
ECPA provides the legal authority to use Carnivore to conduct pen
mode surveillance. 98 While this Note asserts that the categories of in-
formation collected in such surveillance do not merit constitutional
protection,99 that does not necessarily mean that the pen register sec-
tion of ECPA governs the gathering of such information. The pen
register statute restricts the use of pen registers and trap and trace
devices generally, but also authorizes law enforcement use of such de-
vices. Thus, if Carnivore is not a pen register, there are no constraints
on its use in pen mode. Before analyzing whether the statute is an
appropriate authority for using Carnivore in pen mode, this Subsec-
tion provides a general overview of the statute's requirements and
proscriptions.
a. Definition of Pen Register
In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court relied on an earlier
Court precedent when it referred to a pen register as "'a mechanical
device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring
the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is re-
leased."' 1 00 The pen register section of ECPA, passed seven years after
the Smith decision, defines a "pen register" as "a device which records
or decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers
96 See id. § 1841(2). The Committee Report accompanying the legislation that
introduced the pen register section of FISA states that it "establishes a predicate for
the use of pen registers or trap and trace devices that is... analogous to the statutory
standard for the use of such devices in criminal investigations [that is, use under au-
thority of the pen register section of ECPA]." S. REP. No. 105-185, at tit. VI (1998),
available at ftp://ftp.loc.gov/pub/thomas/cplOS/sr185.txt (last visited May 1, 2001).
97 See infra Part III.B.1-2.
98 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
99 See infra Part IIIA.2.
100 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979) (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S.
159, 161 n.1 (1977)). "It does not overhear oral communications and does not indi-
cate whether calls are actually completed." Id. at 736 n.1 (quoting N.Y Tel Co., 434
U.S. at 161 n.1).
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dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such
device is attached."101 Law enforcement reliance on pen register au-
thority to install new technologies, or to broaden the range of infor-
marion that may be intercepted using a pen register, has been
controversial.' 0 2 This is due, at least in part, to the "n umbers dialed or
otherwise transmitted" language of the statute and its requirement that
pen registers be attached to a telephone line. The analysis below suggests
that the FBI's use of Carnivore to monitor the e-mail, web browsing,
and file transfer activity of a targeted user appears comparably contro-
versial. Therefore, a discussion of these concerns will be reserved to
the Carnivore analysis in Part lI.B.l.b.
b. Definition of Trap and Trace Device
According to the pen register section of ECPA, a "trap and trace
device" is "a device which captures the incoming electronic or other
impulses which identify the originating number of an instrument or
device from which a wire or electronic communication was transmit-
ted."10 3 Like the pen register definition, the statutory terms used to
define a trap and trace device have been controversial; the term
"originating number" being the most problematic. 10 4 The use of Cami-
101 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (1994). The statute also states that
such term does not include any device used by a provider or customer of a
wire or electronic communication service for billing, or recording as an inci-
dent to billing, for communications services provided by such provider or
any device used by a provider or customer of a wire communication service
for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course of its
business.
Id Black's Law Dictionary defines a pen register as
[a] mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by
monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is
released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate
whether calls are actually completed; thus, there is no recording or monitor-
ing of the conversation.
BLAcK's LAw DiCIoNARY 1134 (6th ed. 1990).
102 See Corn-Revere Statement, supra note 10, at 8-9, available at http://
www.house.gov/judiciary/comO724.htm; Dempsey Statement, supra note 1, at 8,
available at http://www.cdt.org/testimony/000906dempsey.slnml.
103 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4). The statute cross-references to Title III for the definitions
of wire and electronic communication, where electronic communication can easily be
read to include e-mail, web browsing, or file transfer activity. See id. § 3127(1) (citing
id. § 2510(12) (Supp. 1998)); see also supra note 82 (providing the Title Ill definition
of electronic communication).
104 See Corn-Revere Statement, supra note 10, at 8-9, available at http://
www.house.gov/judiciary/corn0724.htm; Dempsey Statement, supra note 1, at 8,
available at http://wvw.cdLorg/testimony/000906dempsey.shtml.
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vore in pen mode raises similar concerns; thus, a discussion of them is
also reserved for the Carnivore analysis in Part III.B.2.
c. Application for an Installation Order
The pen register section of ECPA generally states that "no person
may install or use a pen register or trap and trace device without first
obtaining a court order [under this statute or FISA]; '"10' - though ex-
ceptions exist for the use of such devices under emergency circum-
stances or by service providers in the course of business.'00 The
statute provides that "[a]n attorney for the Government may [apply]
for an order... authorizing or approving the installation and use of a
pen register or a trap and trace device.., in writing under oath or
equivalent affirmation, to a court of competent jurisdiction." 107 The
application must identify the attorney making the application and the
law enforcement agency conducting the investigation and shall certify
"that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing
criminal investigation being conducted by that agency."' 0
d. Issuance of an Installation Order
The pen register section of ECPA provides that, upon receiving
an application for an order authorizing the installation of a pen regis-
ter or trap and trace device, "the court shall enter an ex parte or-
der ... if the court finds that the attorney for the Government... has
certified to the court that the information likely to be obtained by
such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investiga-
tion."'109 The order must specify, if known, the identity of the person
who has rights to the telephone line to which the pen register or trap
and trace device is to be attached, the identity of the targeted subject
105 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a); see supra Part I1.B.1.b.
106 See 18 U.S.C. § 3125 (1994 & Supp. 1998) (emergency use); id. § 3121(b)
(1994) (service provider use). The service provider exception may be invoked by tile
service provider when used to operate, maintain, or test the service or to protect the
rights or property of the provider or users, see id. § 3121 (b) (1); to make a record of a
communication to protect the provider, another provider, or a user of the service
against fraudulent, unlawful, or abusive use of the service, see id. § 3121 (b) (2); or with
the user's consent, see id. § 3121 (b) (3).
107 Id. § 3122(a) (1). The statute also provides that a state investigative or law en-
forcement officer may apply for an order under the pen register section of ECPA in
the same manner to an equivalent state court. See id. § 3122(a) (2). Because Carni-
yore is only installed by the FBI, this Section will only refer to installations pursuant to
a federal court order.
108 Id. § 3122(b)(2).
109 Id. § 3123(a).
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of the investigation, the number and location of the telephone line to
be monitored, and a statement of the offense to which the surveil-
lance relates.' 10 The liberal nature with which pen register and trap
and trace orders are to be given-the court shall order upon cerlyflca-
tion-is beyond the scope of this Note. Part IM.B.I.b, however, exam-
ines the statute's telephone line attachment requirement, and Part
IV.A and D propose statutory changes that allow for alternative
connections.
e. Limitation on Government Use
The pen register section of ECPA limits the use of pen registers
by providing that "[a] government agency authorized to install and
use a pen register... shall use technology reasonably available to it
that restricts the recording or decoding of electronic or other im-
pulses to the dialing and signaling information utilized in call process-
ing.""' This limitation on the use of pen registers has been analyzed
and debated," 2 particularly due to the "dialing and signaling informa-
tion used in call processing" language, as well as its coverage of pen
registers only. Similar issues are implicated by the FBI's use of Carni-
vore in pen mode; these issues will be examined in Part lI.B.3.
IM. CARmoORE AND THE LAw
Part ll.A above presented the test for determining whether gov-
ernment action constitutes a search or seizure implicating the protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment. In addition, Part II.B.2 introduced
the pen register section of ECPA and indicated that the statute's lan-
guage has been debated. This Part starts by determining that Carni-
vore, when operating in pen mode, does not violate a targeted user's
expectation of privacy and thus does not implicate the Fourth Amend-
ment." 3 It proceeds by illustrating how, under the present statutory
110 See id. § 3123(b) (1). An order to install a pen register under FISA allows for
the use of such device on a "communication instrument or device." 50 U.S.C.
§ 1842(c) (3) (Supp. 1998); see supra Part II.B.l.b.
111 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (1994).
112 See Corn-Revere Statement, supra note 10, at 8-9, available at http://
vivw.house.gov/judiciary/cornO724.htm; Dempsey Statement, supra note 1, at 8,
available at http://,wvw.cdt.org/testimony/000906dempsey.shtml.
113 The Supreme Court has not confronted the expectation of privacy issue re-
garding e-mail and Internet activity. While several lower courts have addressed some
Fourth Amendment e-mail and Internet issues, these cases are generally inapplicable
to this Carnivore discussion due to case-specific facts. See United States %. Hambrick,
No. 99-4793, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18665, at *11 (4th Cir. May 4,2000) (unpublished
opinion) (holding that no expectation of privacy existed in non.content account in-
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language, Carnivore fails to qualify as either a pen register or a trap
and trace device and is therefore not governed by the pen register
statute for pen mode surveillance. It adds that were Carnivore consid-
ered to be a pen register, it nonetheless violates the statutory limita-
tion on government use of such devices. This Part concludes by
stating that Carnivore's pen mode surveillance capabilities, while not
constitutionally constrained, should be statutorily restricted in a man-
ner comparable to the current regime for pen registers and trap and
trace devices.
A. Carnivore's Pen Mode Surveillance Does Not
Implicate the Fourth Amendment
In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court directed that any Fourth
Amendment expectation of privacy inquiry must begin by "specifying
precisely the nature of the state activity that is challenged."' 14 Accord-
ingly, this section must begin with a quick review of what information
is actually acquired by the Carnivore system when operating in pen
mode. Only after that brief review can this Note explain why targeted
users do not maintain an expectation of privacy in the aspects of their
e-mail, web browsing, or file transfer activity that Carnivore gathers
and records during pen mode surveillance.
1. Carnivore's Pen Mode Collections
Through the use of filters selected by FBI personnel, Carnivore is
set for pen mode collection and programmed to collect certain infor-
mation regarding e-mail, web browsing, and file transfer activity. 1l
Regarding the targeted user's e-mail activity, Carnivore collects TO
and FROM information, X'd-out subject header information that indi-
formation given to an ISP in order to establish an e-mail account); United States v.
Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that no expectation of privacy
existed in Internet activity due to a written Internet policy prohibiting personal In-
ternet activity on a government computer and notifying the user of Internet activity
audits); United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding
that no expectation of privacy existed in subscriber information, including IP address,
voluntarily exposed to the Internet service provider); United States v. Maxwell, No.
95-0751, 1996 CAAF LEXIS 116, at *28 (C.AA.F.June 25, 1996) (holding that a net-
work subscriber maintains no expectation of privacy as to the business records relat-
ing to a network account).
114 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979). This Note only discusses Carni-
vore in terms of its pen mode collections and only examines the expectation of pri-
vacy issue in terms of these collections.
115 See IITRI REPoRT, supra note 3, at 3-11 to 3-14, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/jmd/publications/carniv_final.pdf.
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cates the amount of data in the header, and the number of bytes
transferred between the client and the server.1"6 Regarding web
browsing and file transfer activity, Carnivore collects the source and
destination IP addresses and the number of bytes transferred between
the client and the server.'1 7 It is important to note that Carnivore
does not collect the full header information or URL address.""
2. Users Do Not Maintain an Expectation of Privacy in
Addressing Information
The aforementioned types of information, collected by Carnivore
during pen mode surveillance, are voluntarily conveyed to a third
party-the ISP-when the targeted user conducts e-mail, web brows-
ing, or file transfer activity." 9 In addition, e-mail and web browsing
software typically provides this information to the user,r-'u and ISPs
116 See id. at 3-24 (TO and FROM information), 3-24 (header information in X'd-
out presentation), C-3 (bytes transferred and amount of data in header); supra Part
I.C.3.a.
117 See IlTRI REPORT, supra note 3, at C-6, C-8 (IP addresses), available at http://
wiw.usdoj.gov/jmd/publications/carnivfinal.pdf; id. at 3-25 (web browsing: number
of bytes transferred); supra Part I.C.3.b-c.
118 See supra Part II.C.3.b. The results of the IITRI report appear to refute the
concerns expressed in recent congressional testimony that such information, which
may contain privacy-protected components, is collected by Carnivore's pen mode sur-
veillance. See Davidson Statement, supra note 10, at 5-6, available at http://
www.house.gov/judiciary/daiO724.htm.
119 For assertions to the contrary, see Corn-Revere Statement, supra note 10, at 10,
available at http://wivw.house.gov/judiciary/corn0724.htm; Davidson Statement,
supra note 10, at 3-7, available at http://iww-v.house.gov/judiciary/dasi0724.htm;
Dempsey Statement, supra note 1, at 8, available at http://w%,w.cdt.org/testimony/
000906dempsey.shtml; O'Neill Statement, supra note 10, at 2, available at http://
wwwv.senate.gov/-judiciary/962000_mo.htm; Rosen Statement, supra note 10, at 14,
available at http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/962000-jr.htm; Steinhardt Statement,
supra note 10, at 1-5, 7, available at http://u w %.house.gov/judiciary/stei072,t.htm. A
recent student comment relied on these statements, and those of Government repre-
sentatives, to echo the concern that Carnivore's pen mode capabilities invade In-
ternet users' privacy rights. See Johnny Gilman, Comment, Carnivore: The Uneasy
Relationship Between the Fourth Amendment and Electronic Suneillance of Internet Coimmuni-
cations, 9 CoszLAw CoNspEcrus 111, 123-24 (2001). This comment primarily exam-
ines the constitutional and statutory framework that surrounds Carnivore's general
operations, see id at 111-21, and does not rely on the IITRI report or the FOLJA docu-
ments for a better technical understanding of how Carnivore operates and what infor-
mation it gathers during pen mode operations than the aforementioned statements
provide. See id at 122-24.
120 Netscape and Internet Explorer indicate the IP addresses associated with the
URL locations entered by the user and monitor and update the user as to the size and
transfer progress of the information requested.
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and e-mail providers usually monitor and/or log this information in
the ordinary course of business.' 2' Consequently, despite any asser-
tion of a personal or subjective expectation of privacy,1 22 this informa-
tion does not maintain an expectation of privacy that society, or the
courts, will accept as reasonable.' 23 Accordingly, with no expectation
of privacy infringed and the Fourth Amendment not implicated, Car-
nivore's pen mode surveillance capabilities are constrained, if at all,
only by the pen register section of ECPA.
B. Carnivore Is Not Governed by the Pen Register Statute
1. Carnivore Is Not a Pen Register
The pen register section of ECPA defines a pen register as a "de-
vice which records or decodes electronic or other impulses which
identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the tele-
phone line to which such device is attached.' 2 4 While Carnivore
121 Consider the inclusion of sender information, subject line, date, and file size of
e-mail inboxes with software like Eudora and Microsoft Outlook Express and Internet
e-mail providers like Hotmail, Juno, Excite Mail, and Yahoo Mail (to name a few).
Also consider the frequent and persistent notices from e-mail administrators as to the
excessive size of e-mail accounts (I get these when I do not delete old messages
quickly enough on Hotmail). Recall that in Smith, the Court refuted an expectation
of privacy claim in telephone numbers because "pen registers and similar devices are
routinely used by telephone companies 'for the purposes of checking billing opera-
tions, detecting fraud, and preventing violations of law.'" Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S,
735, 742 (1977) (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174-75 (1977)),
122 See Corn-Revere Statement, supra note 10, at 10, available at http://
www.house.gov/judiciary/cornO724.htm; Dempsey Statement, supra note 1, at 8,
available at http://www.cdt.org/testimony/000906dempsey.shtml; O'Neill Statement,
supra note 10, at 2, available at http://wivv.senate.gov/-judiciary/962000_mo.htni;
Steinhardt Statement, supra note 10, at 1-5, 7, available at http://wivw.house.gov/
judiciary/stei0724.htm.
123 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 (holding that information voluntarily conveyed to a
third party waives expectation of privacy); see also United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-
4793, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18665, at *11 (4th Cir. May 4, 2000) (unpublished opin-
ion) (holding that no expectation of privacy existed in non-content account informa-
tion given to an ISP in order to establish an e-mail account); United States v.
Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding that no expectation of
privacy existed in subscriber information, including IP address, voluntarily exposed to
an ISP); United States v. Maxwell, No. 95-0751, 1996 CAAF LEXIS 116, at *28
(C.A.A.F.June 25, 1996) (holding that a network subscriber maintains no expectation
of privacy as to the business records relating to a network account).
124 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (1994); see supra Part II.B.2.a. FISA orders allow for the
use of such devices on a telephone line or a "communication instrument or device."
50 U.S.C. § 1842 (Supp. 1998); see supra Part II.B.1.b. However, the fact that Carni-
vore fails to qualify as a pen register due to the information it collects, see infra Part
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"records or decodes electronic impulses," Carnivore fails to satisfy the
other clauses of this definition and thus fails to quality as a pen regis-
ter under the current statute. Consequently, its use in pen mode is
not governed and cannot be constrained by the pen register section of
ECPA.
a. Carnivore's Pen Mode Collections Do Not Identity
"Numbers Dialed or Othenise Transmitted"
According to the statute, a pen register "records or decodes elec-
tronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or other-
wise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is
attached."125  Assuming Carnivore were attached to a telephone
line,126 it would nonetheless fail to qualify as a pen register due to the
"numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted" language of the definition'27
and would thus fall outside the scope of the pen register section of
ECPA.
The IITRI report indicates that Carnivore acquires information
during pen mode surveillance depending on what type of electronic
communication it has been programmed to monitor-e-mail, web
browsing, or file transfer activity. When monitoring e-mail activity,
Carnivore acquires the e-mail addresses of recipients to whom e-mail
has been sent or files have been transferred.12 As all e-mail users
know, e-mail addresses are, at best, alphanumeric designations (for
llI.B.l.a, obviates the connectivity discrepancy between FISA and the pen register sec-
tion of ECPA. Recall that the Committee Report accornpan)ing FISA's pen register
section intended the pen register section of ECPA to provide dlie statutory definition
and standard for the use of such devices under FISA. S&eS. RFP. No. 105-185, at tit. VI
(1998), available at ftp://ftp.loc.gov/pub/thomas/cplO5/srl85.Lxt (last isited May 1,
2001). Accordingly, since Carnivore is not a pen register under the pen register sec-
tion of ECPA, as this Note asserts, it is not a pen register under the pen register
section of FISA.
125 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3). The Committee Report accompan)ing FISA's pen regis-
ter section makes no attempt to otherwise define a pen register and intends such a
device be used in conformity with the pen register section of ECPA. See S. REP. No.
105-185, at tit. VI (1998), available at ftp://ftp.loc.gov/pub/tiomas/cplO5/srl85.xt
(last visited May 1, 2001).
126 This assumption will be refuted in Part III.B.1.b.
127 For similar assertions, see Corn-Revere Statement, supira note 10, at 8-9, availa-
ble at http://iw.house.gov/judiciary/corn0724.htm; Dempsey Statement, suprz note
1, at 8, available at http://ww..cdLorg/testimony/000906dempsey.shrull; Steinhardt
Statement, supra note 10, at 3-4, 7-8, available at hittp://wiw.lotse.gov/judiciary/
stei0724.htm. The statute does not define what "numbers dialed or otherwise trans-
mitted" means. See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).
128 See IITRI REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-24, available at http://%%%w,.ttsdoj.govjmd/
publications/carnivfinal.pdf.
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example, student.18@nd.edu), but in many cases are purely alphabeti-
cal (for example, student@nd.edu). 129 Consequently, such addresses
cannot reasonably be interpreted to mean "numbers dialed or other-
wise transmitted."' 3 0 With respect to pen mode surveillance of web
browsing and file transfer activity, however, Carnivore does limit inter-
ceptions to the purely numeric IP addresses associated with these ac-
tivities (for example, 255.255.255.255))'31 which appears to conform
to the statutory language "numbers... otherwise transmitted." This
necessarily creates, however, an inconsistency for Carnivore deploy-
ments-the pen register section of ECPA governs the gathering of
web browsing and file transfer IP addresses but not e-mail addresses.
Consulting the legislative history behind the pen register section of
ECPA mitigates this inconsistency.132
The Committee Report accompanying ECPA addresses the sub-
ject of pen register use and states, "the term 'pen register' means a
device which records or decodes electronic or other impulses which
identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted for the purposes
of routing telephone calls, with respect to wire communications, on
the telephone line to which such device is attached." 133 The Commit-
tee Report also states that pen registers record "the telephone num-
bers to which calls have been placed from a particular telephone," ' "
"only the telephone numbers dialed,"135 and "merely the electronic
switching signals that connect two telephones." 136 In addition, one of
the bill's sponsors, Senator Patrick Leahy, referred to pen registers as
129 These are imaginary e-mail addresses, but illustrative of what alphanumeric
and alphabetical addresses look like.
130 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3). For a compelling argument that rejects the acquisition of
header information under pen register authority, see Chris J. Katopis, "Searching"
Cyberspace: The Fourth Amendment and Electronic Mai 14 TEMP. ENVrL. L. & TEcl.J. .175,
196-99 (1995).
131 See ILTRI REPORT, supra note 3, at C-5, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/
publications/carnivfinal.pdf.
132 See S. REP. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555.
133 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 49 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3603; see
Corn-Revere Statement, supra note 10, at 8-9, available at http://www.house.gov/juli-
ciary/corn0724.htm.
134 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.G.C.A.N. 3555, 3564; set,
Corn-Revere Statement, supra note 10, at 8-9, available at http://www.house.gov/judi-
ciary/corn0724.htm.
135 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 49 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3603; sec
Corn-Revere Statement, supra note 10, at 8-9, available at http://wwiv.house.gov/juli-
ciary/corn0724.htm.
136 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.GA.N. 3555, 3564; see
Corn-Revere Statement, supra note 10, at 8-9, available at http://www.house.gov/judi-
ciary/corn0724.htm.
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"devices used for recording which phone numbers have been dialed
from a particular phone" in the legislative summary accompanying
the bill's introduction. 3 7 To be sure, this legislative history is not dis-
positive of what constitutes "numbers dialed or otherwise transmit-
ted," but it clearly supports a narrow interpretation of these terms to
which IP addresses would not be included.1as According to legislative
history, therefore, Carnivore is not a pen register, because it does not
record telephone numbers and is not constrained by the pen register
section of ECPA when used for pen mode surveillance.
The understanding of what information pen registers actually re-
cord, as reflected in the statutory text and the legislative history, has
been similarly adopted in judicial precedent. In United States v. NAe
York Telephone Co., the Supreme Court stated that pen registers "dis-
close only the telephone numbers that have been dialed-a means of
establishing communication."' 3 9 In Smith, the Supreme Court quoted
this language when it held that the use of pen registers did not violate
an expectation of privacy and thus did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment."4° Numerous lower court decisions subsequent to Smith,
including a case decided in 2000, have used this language or suffi-
ciently similar language, to support the proposition that pen registers
only acquire telephone numbers. 41 Consequently, judicial interpre-
tation provides further support for this Note's conclusion that the IP
addresses gathered by Carnivore when operating in pen mode are not
within the ambit of the "numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted." Thus,
137 131 CONG. REc. 24,370 (1985).
138 For a similar assertion, see Corn-Revere Statement, supra note 10, at 8-9, avail-
able at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/cornO724.htm, and Katopis, supra note 130,
at 198 (regarding e-mail addresses).
139 United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977).
140 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).
141 See U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 3127(3) (1994)) ("Pen registers record telephone numbers of outgoing calls
... ."); Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 292 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing S. REP. No. 99-541,
at 49 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3603) (stating that a pen register's
.only capability is to intercept [telephone] numbers"); In re GrandJury Proceedings,
654 F.2d 268, 277 n.3 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S.
161 at n.1) (stating that "a pen register is a mechanical device that records the num-
bers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial
on the telephone is released"); United States %. Michigan, 122 F. Supp. 2d 785, 789
(E.D. Mich. 2000) (defining pen register parenthetically as "tracking numbers dialed
from a particular phone");Jefferson v. Winnebago County, No. 94-C50151, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2425, at *18 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 1995) (citing In reApplication of the
United States of America for an Order Authorizing the Installation of a Pen Register,
610 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (3d Cir. 1979)) (stating that "a pen register identifies what
numbers were dialed from a subject telephone").
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judicial precedent also accords with this Note's assertion that Carni-
vore is not a pen register under the statutory definition and is there-
fore not constrained by the pen register section of ECPA when
operating in pen mode.
b. Carnivore Is Not Attached to a Telephone Line
The statutory definition of a pen register requires installation of a
pen register device on a telephone line,142 and other statutory provi-
sions are predicated on a telephone line connection by such a de-
vice.' 43 The IITRI report indicates, however, that Carnivore is not
attached to a telephone line; rather, it is installed as a tap directly
onto an ISP's Ethernet using an Ethernet adapter. 44 Consequently,
because Carnivore does not attach to telephone lines, it does not fit
within ECPA's definition of a pen register and, thus, is not governed
by the pen register section of ECPA.
The legislative history of ECPA supports this narrow interpreta-
tion. In the Committee Report accompanying ECPA,i 45 the Commit-
tee refers to pen registers only as devices that are installed on
telephone lines to record telephone numbers. Specifically, the Com-
mittee Report states,
[T] he term "pen register" means a device which records or decodes
electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or
142 See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (1994). The statutory definition of a trap and trace
device does not require connection to a telephone line, see id. § 3127(4), and the
legislative history that is discussed below makes no indication that such a connection
is required. See S. RP. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555. It can
be argued that the other sections of the statute require indication of the telephone
line to which a pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3123(b)(1)(C) (An installation order must indicate "the number and, if known,
physical location of the telephone line to which the pen register or trap and trace
device is to be attached."); see also Waddell 50 F.3d at 290-91 (making this determina-
tion). However, because the statutory definition of a trap and trace device lacks this
requirement, this Section will only contend that Carnivore fails to qualify as a pen
register due to the lack of such a connection.
143 For example, a pen register order must indicate "the number and, if known,
physical location of the telephone line to which the pen register ... is to be attached,"
18 U.S.C. § 3123(b) (1) (C), and also the "identity, if known, of the person to whom is
leased or in whose name is listed the telephone line to which the pen register.., is to
be attached," id. § 3123(b) (1) (A). See also id. § 3123(d) (2) (stating that the order
must indicate "the person owning or leasing the line to which the pen register or a
trap and trace device is attached"); Corn-Revere Statement, supra note 10, at 9, availa-
ble at http://vwv.house.gov/judiciary/corn0724.htm.
144 See IITRI REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-10, available at http://Iw.usdoj.gov/jmd/
publications/carniv__inal.pdf; supra Part IA.
145 S. REP. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.CA.N. 3555.
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otherwise transmitted for the purposes of routing telephone calls,
with respect to wire communications, on the telephone line to
which such device is attached. 146
This legislative history indicates that Congress understood pen regis-
ters to be directly attached on telephone lines; it should not be argued
that the statute means otherwise. Consequently, the legislative history
supports this Note's determination that Carnivore does not operate as
a pen register in the statutory sense and thus is not constrained by the
statute's restrictions.
Subsequent legislation provides additional support for this asser-
tion. The sections of FISA that authorize the use of pen registers do
not limit the use of such devices to a telephone line, but allow for
their use on a "communication instrument or device." t47 The Com-
mittee Report accompanying these FISA provisions does not account
for this deviation from the provisions of the pen register statute,
though it states that the Committee intends such devices be defined
by and used in conformity with the pen register section of ECPA.' 4s
This suggests that Congress recognized the inadequacy of the pen reg-
ister statute's telephone line connection requirement and made the
necessary adjustments in the appropriate sections of FISA. Accord-
ingly, because Carnivore is not attached to a telephone line, it is not a
pen register under the pen register section of ECPA and is thus not
governed by the statute's regulations.
A recentjudicial interpretation of this language also held that the
statute requires a device be attached to a telephone line to qualify as a
146 Id. at 49, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3603; see id. at 42, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3600 ("Briefly, a pen register is a device which can be attached to a
telephone line for the purpose of decoding and recording the numbers dialed from
that line."); Corn-Revere Statement, supra note 10, at 9. available at htp://
wvv.house.gov/judiciary/corno724.htm.
147 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (3), (d) (2) (Supp. 1998).
148 See S. REP. No. 105-185, at tit. VI (1998), available at ftp://ftp.loc.gov/pub/
thomas/cplO5/sr185.txt (last visited May 1, 2001). Attorney GeneralJanet Reno and
FBI Director Louis Freeh testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee on
the subject of Fiscal Year 1999 Appropriations for Counterterrorism, the legislative
source of the pen register section of FISA, and made no mention of pen registers,
other than Director Freeh's closing remark renewing a request for authorization to
use such devices for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations.
See Fscal Year 1999 Budget Request for Counteterrosmn: Hearing Before the Commere, Jas-
tice, State and Judiciary Subcomn. of the Senate Appropriations Comm., 105th Cong. (1998),
at LEXIS Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Hearing Summaries
database (Federal News Service, May 31, 1998) (testimony ofJanct Reno, Attorney
General of the United States, and Louis Freeh, Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation).
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pen register. In Brown v. Waddell,149 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the aforementioned legislative
history and found that a digital display pager clone was not a pen
register under the statute. In doing so, the Court quoted the statutory
definition of a pen register and held,
As a matter of plain textual meaning, a digital display pager clone
does not itself fit this definition-in the critical sense that it is not a
device [that is] attached to a telephone line. It receives (and "in-
tercepts") electronic impulses transmitted by radio waves, and is "at-
tached" to no transmission device. Hence, it is not defined into the
category of pen registers by the statutory definition of that
device.' 50
Like the digital display pager clone in Waddell, Carnivore is not a de-
vice attached to a telephone line-it is connected to an ISP's Ethernet
via an Ethernet adapter-and a telephone line is not used to maintain
its connection to the Ethernet. 151 While Carnivore arguably is at-
tached to a "transmission device," the Ethernet itself, such a connec-
tion also is not facilitated or maintained via a telephone line.
Consequently, under the Fourth Circuit's rationale in Waddell, Carni-
vore cannot be considered a pen register in the critical sense of the
statutory definition and thus cannot be constrained by the pen regis-
ter section of ECPA.
2. Carnivore Does Not Qualify as a Trap and Trace Device
The pen register section of ECPA defines a "trap and trace de-
vice" as "a device which captures the incoming electronic or other
impulses which identify the originating number of an instrument or
device from which a wire or electronic communication was transmit-
ted."'152 Computers clearly qualify as instruments or devices from
149 50 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 1995).
150 Id. at 290-91 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (1994)).
151 For an explanation of Carnivore and its connection to an Ethernet, see supra
notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
152 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (1994). The statute cross-references to Title III for the
definitions of wire and electronic communication, where electronic communication
can easily be read to include e-mail, web browsing, or file transfer activity. See id.
§ 3127(1). According to Title III, electronic communication means "any transfer of
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric or photooptical sys-
tem that affects interstate or foreign commerce." Id. § 2510(12) (Supp. 1998); see
Corn-Revere Statement, supra note 10, at 9, available at http://www.house.gov/judici.
ary/com0724.htm. As with the pen register definition, the Committee Report accom-
panying FISA's trap and trace section makes no attempt to othenvise define a trap
and trace device and intends such a device to be used in conformity with the pen
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which electronic communications are transmitted; e-mail, web brows-
ing, and file transfer activity clearly qualify as "incoming electronic or
other impulses" and "electronic communication." Therefore, the use
of Carnivore in pen mode under trap and trace authority appears par-
tially supported by the statutory language. However, the requirement
that the captured information identify the "originating number" of the
transmitting device causes Carnivore to fall outside the statute's
governance.
The nTRI report indicates that Carnivore, when operating in pen
mode, acquires the information it is programmed to monitor with re-
gard to e-mail, web browsing, or file transfer activity. When operating
as a trap and trace device, Carnivore acquires the e-mail addresses of
computer users from whom e-mail has been sent to the targeted
user I5 3 and the source IP addresses of the web browsing or file trans-
fer activity directed to the targeted user. 54 Carnivore's gathering of e-
mail sender information dearly cannot qualify as "originating num-
bers" due to the at-best alphanumeric nature of the information ac-
quired.' 55 The intercepted IP addresses, on the other hand, are
completely numeric means of identifying the instrument or device
transmitting the electronic communication' 6 and thus initially ap-
pear to fall within the statutory qualification. The legislative history of
ECPA and judicial interpretations of the statutory language, however,
belie this understanding. 157
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompan)ing ECPA
uses the statutory language to describe a trap and trace deviceY 5s
However, the Report defines a trap and trace device in its glossary as a
device which "records the numbers of telephones from which calls have
been placed to a particular telephone."'5 9 While this definition does
register section of ECPA. See S. REP. No. 105-185, at tit. VI (1998), available at ftp://
ftp.loc.gov/pub/thomas/cp105/sr185.xt (last visited May 1, 2001). Therefore, since
Carnivore is not a trap and trace device under the pen register section of ECPA, as
this Note asserts, it is not a trap and trace device for the purpose of FISA.
153 See ITRI REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-24, available at http://%%%-v.usdoj.gov/jmd/
publications/camiv__final.pd.
154 See id. at C-6 (web browsing activity), C-8 (file transfer activities).
155 See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text; supra Part I.A.
156 See IlTRI REPORT, supra note 3, at C-6, C-8, available at http://%-w.usdoj.gov/
jmd/publications/carnivfinal.pdf, supra note 131 and accompanying text; stpra Part
1A.
157 See Corn-Revere Statement, supra note 10, at 8-9, available at http://
www.house.gov/judiciary/cornO724.htm.
158 SeeS. RE. No. 99-541, at 49 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3603.
159 Id. at 10, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3564; Corn-Revere Statement, supra
note 10, at 9, available at http://i%,%wv.house.gov/judidary/cornO724.htm.
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not dispose of the ambiguity of the "originating number" language, it
suggests that Congress understood trap and trace devices to record
only telephone numbers. Accordingly, Carnivore's pen mode capabil-
ities appear to fall outside the statute's regulation. However, because
this prior legislative history only discusses what constitutes a trap and
trace device briefly, and does so inconclusively, the legislative history
of subsequent legislation should be considered for additional clarifica-
tion of these terms before such an assertion can be made.
In 1994, Congress enacted the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act (CALEA),160 which requires communication
providers to assist law enforcement officers in conducting electronic
surveillance. Among other things, CALEA compels these providers to
assist law enforcement acquisition of "call-identifying information,"'"'1
which the legislative history of CALEA explains to include informa-
tion acquired by a trap and trace device. 162 The Committee Report
accompanying CALEA states, "In trap and trace investigations, [call-
identifying information] are the incoming pulses, tones, or messages
which identify the originating number of the facility from which the
call was placed." 163 While this language is no more dispositive of the
issue than was the ECPA legislative history, it supports this Note's as-
sertion that Congress understood trap and trace devices to record
only telephone numbers. No other statutory text or legislative history,
prior or subsequent to ECPA or CALEA, indicates that Congress un-
derstands or intends trap and trace devices to operate otherwise.16'
Consequently, because Carnivore's pen mode operations cannot be
considered operations of a trap and trace device under the pen regis-
ter statute's definition, Carnivore cannot be constrained as such by
the statute's regulations.
160 H.R. 4922, 103d Cong., Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (enacted).
161 H.R. 4922, 103d Cong. § 108(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4285 (1994)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 1007(a) (1) (1994)).
162 See H.R. REP. No. 103-827, pt. 1, at 21 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3489, 3501.
163 Id. This same language was used in the section-by-section analysis Senator
Leahy provided when he introduced CALEA in 1994. See 140 CONG. ReLc. 20,448-49
(1994). The Committee Reports add that "[o]ther dialing tones that may be gener-
ated by the sender.., are not to be treated as call-identifying information." H.R. Rt,.
No. 103-827, at 21 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3501.
164 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-383, pt. 3, § 302 (1995), available at fip://
ftp.loc.gov/pub/thomas/cp104/hr383.txt (last visited May 1, 2001) ("Section 302
grants the FBI authority to utilize 'pen registers' (which record the numbers dialed
on a telephone) and 'trap and trace devices' (which record the number from which a
call originates), such as through so-called 'caller ID.'").
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Judicial opinions interpreting and applying the statutory defini-
tion of a trap and trace device further echo the assertion that such
devices only record telephone numbers. 65 In 2000, the D.C. Circuit
specifically examined ECPA and CALEA and discussed the use of trap
and trace devices under these acts in United States Telecom Ass'n v.
FCC.166 Comparing Title Ill warrants to ECPA orders, the court noted
in dicta that ECPA "establish[ed] less demanding standards for cap-
turing telephone numbers through the use of... trap and trace de-
vices." 167 Additionally, the court cited the statutory definition and
stated, "trap and trace devices record telephone numbers from which
incoming calls originate." l '6 While this decision, like the legislative
history, is not dispositive of the intended meaning of the term
"originating number," it suggests that courts, like Congress, under-
stand trap and trace devices to record only telephone numbers.
These judicial opinions, coupled with the legislative history of the
statute and subsequent legislation, substantiate this Note's assertion
that trap and trace devices, as presently defined, only intercept incom-
ing telephone numbers. As discussed, when operating in pen mode as
a "trap and trace device," Carnivore intercepts the sender information
for e-mail activity, which is at best alphanumeric, and the purely
numeric source IP addresses for web browsing and file transfer activ-
ity. Because these clearly are not telephone numbers, in any sense of
that term, Carnivore is not operating as a "trap and trace device"
within the statutory definition and thus cannot be constrained as such
under the pen register section of ECPA.
165 See, e-g., U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing
18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (1994)) ("iT]rap and trace devices record telephone numbers
from which incoming calls originate, much like common caller-ID systems."); United
States v. deLay, Nos. 92-30090 & 92-30091, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 4911, at *5 n.3 (9th
Cir. Nov. 18, 1993) (unpublished opinion) ("A pen register tracks outgoing phone
calls, and a trap and trace device tracks incoming calls."); United States v. Swinburne,
No. 90-10492, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 11594, at ;3 n.1 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1993) (unpub-
lished opinion) ("A trap and trace identifies the originating points of incoming calls
to a telephone number ... .");Jefferson v. Winnebago County, No. 94-C50151, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2425, at *18 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 1995) (stating that "a pen register
identifies what numbers were dialed from a subject telephone whereas a [trap and]
trace identifies from where a particular call is being made"). I found no cases that
interpreted the statutory definition of a trap and trace device to mean anything other
than a device that captures only telephone numbers.
166 227 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
167 Id. at 454.
168 I.
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3. Carnivore Does Not Comply with the Government Limitation
ECPA's pen register section limits government use of pen regis-
ters to reasonably available technology "that restricts the recording or
decoding of electronic or other impulses to the dialing and signaling
information utilized in call processing." 169 This limitation was en-
acted as part of the 1994 CALEA legislation.' 7 0 Accordingly, to deter-
mine if Carnivore complies with this limitation-assuming it
constituted a pen register in the statutory sense and was thus governed
by the pen register section of ECPA-CALEA's legislative history
should be examined to determine what Congress meant by the terms
"dialing and signaling information utilized in call processing."
The Committee Report accompanying CALEA reports that the
limitation restricts the use of a pen register device to technology that,
when reasonably available, "restricts the information captured by such
device to the dialing or signaling information necessary to direct or
process a call, excluding any further communication conducted
through the use of dialed digits that would otherwise be captured."'171
The Report also discusses the dialing and signaling information asso-
ciated with "call-identifying information" and states, "In pen register
investigations, these pulses, tones, or messages identify the numbers
dialed from the facility that is the subject of the court order [or other
lawful authorization]." 172 Not only does this legislative history indi-
cate that the amendment was intended to limit the acquirable infor-
mation to that which relates to a telephone call, but also, it indicates
that Congress specifically excluded the interception of numbers en-
tered after the initial telephone number is dialed.
The IITRI report indicates that Carnivore, when operating in pen
mode, collects the addressing information for e-mail activity and the
source and destination IP addresses for web browsing and file transfer
activity.175 These types of information definitively are not "dialing in-
formation," and while they could be construed as "signaling informa-
tion," they do "identify the numbers dialed," and they are neither "used
169 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (1994).
170 See H.R. 4922, 103d Cong. § 207(c), Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4292
(1994).
171 H.R. REP. No. 103-827, pt. 1, at 32 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.G.CA.N. 3489,
3512.
172 Id. at 21, reprinted in 1994 U.S.G.GA.N. at 3501. This same language was used
in the section-by-section analysis Senator Leahy provided when he introduced CALEA
in 1994. See 140 CONG. R c. 20,448 (1994).
173 See ITRI REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-24 (e-mail), G6 (web browsing activity), C.
8 (file transfer activities), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/publications/
camivfinal.pdf.
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in call processing" nor "necessary to direct or process a rall." Further-
more, IP addresses are numbers transmitted after any initial tele-
phone numbers are dialed-assuming the communication was sent by
a user who initially connected to a communications provider via tele-
phone line-in direct contravention of what the statute authorizes
and the legislative history confirms. As such, even if Carnivore quali-
fies as a pen register under the statutory language and was therefore
governed by the pen register section of ECPA, the use of Carnivore for
pen mode surveillance does not comply with the statutory limitation
on government use of such devices.
C. Carnivore's Pen Mode Surveillance Is Not
Constrained by Existing Law
As this analysis indicates, Carnivore's pen mode surveillance does
not implicate the Fourth Amendment 74 and is not restricted statuto-
rily. 7 -5 Accordingly, despite the DOJ's and FBI's contrary understand-
ing, the FBI may deploy Carnivore for pen mode surveillance without
any legal constraints.'7 6 However, because Carnivore, when operating
in pen mode, gathers information of which individuals may maintain
a personal or subjective expectation of privacy-77-even if that expec-
tation is not reasonable by Fourth Amendment standards-Congress
174 See supra Part IIA2.
175 See supra Part III.B.
176 Without legal restraints, state governments might also use Carnivore-like de-
vices in a similar manner. Consider that the pen register section of ECPA provides for
state government use of pen registers and trap and trace devices under authority of
the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3122(a) (2) (1994). If Carnivore is neither a pen register
nor a trap and trace device under this statute, state governments do not need to
consider the federal statute before using a Carnivore-like device. The only deterrent,
assuming there is not a more restrictive state statute, would be the possibility of prose-
cution for violating the federal statute. See id. § 3121(d) (*Ahoever knotvingly vio-
lates subsection (a) shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both."). Rather than wait for a court to interpret die pen register statute in
such a prosecution, it seems more appropriate for Congress to statutorily address the
use of new surveillance technologies by implementing recommendations like those
outlined in Part IV of this Note.
177 See Corn-Revere Statement, supra note 10, at 8, atailable at http://
vww.house.gov/judiciary/corn0724.htm; Davidson Statement, supra note 10, at 3-7,
available at http://w-,w.house.gov/judiiary/daiO724.htm; Dempsey Statement,
supra note 1, at 6, available at http://wwv.cdt-org/testimony/000906dempsey.shtml;
Steinhardt Statement, supra note 10, at 1-5, 7-9, available at http://ww,,.house.gov/
judiciary/stei0724.htm.
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should revise the pen register section of ECPA to provide some statu-
tory restrictions on Carnivore's pen mode surveillance capabilities.17 1
IV. RECOMMENDA'TONS
The FBI's rationale for designing and implementing Carnivore is
convincing, 179 and Carnivore is an invaluable tool for satisfying the
government's needs. 80 Part III indicated that Carnivore is neither
proscribed constitutionally nor restricted statutorily. While the FBI
should continue to use Carnivore to conduct pen mode surveillance,
it should not be able to do so without any legal constraints. Accord-
ingly, Congress should revise the pen register section of ECPA to en-
compass Carnivore's pen mode surveillance capabilities.',' In
addition, the revised statute should accommodate future develop-
ments in communications and surveillance technologies. This Part
178 Congress followed a similar rationale when it enacted the original pen register
section of ECPA in 1986. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1-3 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555-57.
179 See supra Introduction.
180 See supra Part I.B.
181 On April 13, 2000, Senator Leahy introduced The Internet Security Act of
2000, a bill that would have greatly expanded the pen register section of ECPA and
that served as the foundation for the statutory changes proposed in this Note. See S.
2430, 106th Cong. § 7 (2000), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
z?c106:S.2430: (last visited May 1, 2001). This Note expands on the language pro-
posed in that Act in order to provide further clarity and breadth to the pen register
statute. In addition, Senator Leahy's amendment sought to provide for greaterjudi-
cial discretion in authorizing pen register or trap and trace device applications, see id.
§ 7, an idea that is neither proposed nor endorsed in this Note. Another piece or
legislation from the 106th Congress initially sought to amend the statute and allow
broader pen register or trap and trace surveillance, but it only sought to add "e-mail
addresses" to the scope of collectable information. See Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 2000, H.R. 5018, 106th Cong. § 4, available at http://thomas.locgov/
cgi-bin/query/D?c106:1:./temp/cl6BtXONk:: (last visited May 1, 2001) (allowing
for judicial discretion in approving applications). This Note does not rely on this Act
because the term "e-mail addresses" is not sufficiently broad to avoid some of the
problems outlined in this Note (for example, IP addresses are not "e-mail" addresses
and thus would not be covered under House Resolution 5018). The other legislation
proposed in the 106th Congress did not address the changes proposed in this Note.
See Internet Integrity and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2000, S. 2448, 106th
Cong. § 301, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c1O6:2:./temp/
-clO6o8e7Us:: (last visited May 1, 2001) (requiring description of facts underlying
certification and additional reporting of pen register and trap and trace usage); Elec-
tronic Rights for 21st Century Act, S. 854, 106th Cong. § 103 (1999), available at
http://thomas.oc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c106:S.854: (last visited May 1, 2001) (grant-
ing courts discretion to determine if the information sought is relevant to an ongoing
criminal investigation).
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proposes statutory language that accomplishes both of these
objectives.
A. Revise the Statutory Definitions
The pen register section of ECPA does not cover the use of Carni-
vore as a pen register, because Carnivore collects more information
than the "the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted" and because it is
not attached to a telephone line.182 In addition, the pen register statute
does not cover the use of Carnivore as a trap and trace device, because
Carnivore collects information that is inconsistent with the "originat-
ing number" limitation, as understood from the statutory text, legisla-
tive history, and judicial interpretations. 8 3 The following definitions
of pen register and trap and trace device bring Carnivore within the
ambit of the pen register section of ECPA and, also, are broad enough
to accommodate the inevitable developments in communications and
surveillance technologies.
Adopting the proposed changes to the pen register definition,
the amended § 3127(3) would read as follows (proposed changes
italicized) :184
(3) the term "pen register"-
(a) means a device orprocess that records or decodes electronic
or other impulses that identiy, the telephone numbers, electronic
addresses, other electronic routing information, or other identifiers
dialed or otherwise transmitted by an instrument or device orfacil-
ity from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted
and used for purposes of identifying the destination or termination
of such communication; and
(b) does not include any device orprocess used by a proxider or
customer of a wire or electronic communication service for
billing, or recording as incident to billing, for communica-
tions services provided by such provider or any device or
process by a provider or customer of a vire communications
service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the
ordinary course of business.
182 See supra Part flI.B.1. Accordingly, Carnivore also is not a pen register for FISA
purposes. See supra notes 119-20, 143 and accompanying text.
183 See supra Part III.B.2. Likewise, Carnivore also is not a trap and trace device for
FISA purposes. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
184 Subsection (b) is identical to what Senator Leahy proposed in Senate Bill 2430,
but subsection (a) contains language beyond what was proposed in that bill. See The
Intemet Security Act of 2000, S. 2430, 106th Cong. § 8(b) (1), available at hup://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c106:S.2430: (last visited May 1, 2001). Adopting
these changes will also bring the use of Carnivore within the ambit of the FISA provi-
sions governing the use of pen registers. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1842-1844 (Supp. 1998).
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Adopting the proposed changes to the trap and trace device defi-
nition, the amended § 3127(4) would read as follows (proposed
changes italicized):185
(4) the term "trap and trace device" means a device or process
which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses
which identify the originating telephone numbers, electronic ad-
dresses, other routing information, or other identifiers dialed or other-
wise transmitted by an instrument or device or facility from which
a wire or electronic communication is transmitted.
These definitional changes encompass Carnivore's pen mode collec-
tion of sender and recipient addresses in e-mail activity, which clearly
qualify as "electronic addresses," and the IP addresses associated with
web browsing and file transfer activity, which clearly qualify as either
"electronic addresses" or "other routing information." Therefore,
these proposed changes provide statutory governance for future Car-
nivore deployments, as it presently operates. In addition, the breadth
of these new terms-and the additional phrases "or other identifier"
and "or device or facility"-allows for developments in communica-
tions and surveillance technologies.
B. Revise the Government Limitation
The pen register statute's current government limitation section
confines the information acquired by pen registers to "dialing and sig-
naling information utilized in call processing."8 6 As outlined, even if
Carnivore constitutes a pen register, the information Carnivore gath-
ers does not satisfy this limitation as understood from the statutory
text and its legislative history.'8 7 In addition to this Carnivore-specific
problem, however, the existing statutory limitation is deficient be-
cause it only applies to pen registers, rather than to pen registers and
trap and trace devices alike.1 8 As such, any proposed change must
expand the limitation to cover trap and trace devices, must encompass
the information that Carnivore currently intercepts, and must provide
for developments in communications and surveillance technologies.
Adopting the following recommendations, the amended § 3121 (c)
185 This proposes changes beyond what Senator Leahy offered. See The Internet
Security Act of 2000, S. 2430, 106th Cong. § 8(b)(2), available at http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c106:S.2430: (last visited May 1, 2001). These
changes also will bring Carnivore within the ambit of the FISA provisions governing
the use of trap and trace devices. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1842-1844 (Supp. 1998).
186 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (1994).
187 See supra Part III.B.3.
188 See 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c).
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would satisfy these objectives and would read as follows (proposed
changes italicized):189
(c) Limitation. A government agency authorized to install and use
a pen register or trap and trace device under this chapter (18 U.S.c.
§§ 3121 et seq.) or under State law shall use technology reasonably
available to it that restricts the recording or decoding of electronic
or other impulses to those authorized in this chapter (18 U.S.C. §§ 3121
et seq.).
This language not only encompasses trap and trace devices and Carni-
vore, but also changes the limitation from "dialing and signaling infor-
mation utilized in call processing" to "those authorized in this
chapter." Doing so binds the limitation statute to the language of the
authorizing provisions and avoids the interpretation problems that
previously existed when the limiting and authorizing clauses utilized
different terminology.190 If the authorizing provisions conform to this
Note's definitional proposals,' 9 ' the government limitation section
will cover Carnivore's pen mode capabilities and will not limit such
surveillance-or that of similar future technologies-any further than
such use is limited by the new definitions.
C. Add a Limitation Notice to Issued Orders
The Issuance of Court Order section should be revised to reflect
the language of the new government limitation as well. Adopting the
following recommendation, the amended § 3123(b) would require
that an order authorizing the use of a pen register or trap and trace
device 192
(3) shall direct that the use of the pen register or trap and trace device be
conducted in such a way as to minimize the recording or decoding of any
electronic or other impulses that are not related to the telephone numbers,
189 This proposes changes that were not offered by Senator Leahy. &e The In-
ternet Security Act of 2000, S. 2430, 106th Cong., available at http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/query/z?c106:S.2430: (last visited May 1, 2001).
190 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) ("[T]he term 'pen register' means a device which
records or decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or
otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is attached . . . ." (empha-
sis added)), with id § 3121(c) ("A government agency authorized to install and use a
pen register... shall use technology reasonably available to it that restricts the re-
cording or decoding of electronic or other impulses to the dialing and signaling infor-
mation used in call processing." (emphasis added)).
191 See supra Part V.A.
192 This proposes changes beyond those of Senator Leahy. &eeThe Internet Secur-
ity Act of 2000, S. 2430, 106th Cong. § 7(2) (C), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/query/z?c106:S.2430: (last visited May 1, 2001).
2001] 1257
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
electronic addresses, other electronic routing information, or other identifiers
dialed or otherwise transmitted by an instrument or device or facility for use
in wire or electronic communication processing or transmission.
The inclusion of this clause accomplishes two goals. First, it re-
minds those relying on the statute-government attorneys, state inves-
tigative or law enforcement officers, and judges-of the existing
limitations on the use of pen registers, trap and trace devices, and
other surveillance tools, such as Carnivore, in a section of the statute
that they are likely to review on a regular basis. Second, it requires
that the actual order authorizing the use of such a device contain lan-
guage that specifically tracks the statutory limitations, thereby giving
clear and direct notice to those acting pursuant to the order of what is
and is not permitted and proscribed under the law.
D. Modify the Statute's Attachment Requirement
The statute's current Issuance of Order section, § 3123, consist-
ently refers to telephone lines and requires the attachment of pen
registers and trap and trace devices to such lines.193 As discussed, Car-
nivore is not attached to a telephone line and therefore cannot coni-
ply with an order issued under existing law.194 Accordingly, the
relevant subsections of § 3123 must be amended to allow for the at-
tachment, application, or connection of pen registers or trap and trace
devices to telephone lines and other facilities.'9 5 These changes not
193 See 18 U.S.C. § 3123(b), (d); see also supra notes 137-38 and accompanying
text.
194 See supra Part.III.B.l.b.
195 This proposal is substantially similar to what Senator Leahy offered, but adds
.or connected" before his legislation added "or applied." See The Internet Security
Act of 2000, S. 2430, 106th Cong. § 8(a), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
query/z?c106:S.2430: (last visited May 1, 2001). This Note rejects the FISA language
that allows connection of a pen register or trap and trace device to a "communication
instrument or device," see 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (c) (3) (Supp. 1998), because such terms
appear open to interpretative attack (for example, an argument that the instrument
or device is not to be used for "communication"). Accordingly, § 3123(b), as
amended by this Note's proposals, would read as follows (proposed changes
italicized):
(b) Contents of order. An order issued under this section-
(1) shall specify-
(A) the identity, if known, of the person to whom is leased or in
whose name is listed the telephone line or otherfacility to which
the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached, con-
nected, or applied;
(B) the identity, if known, of the person who is the subject of the
criminal investigation;
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only encompass and accommodate the manner in which the FBI cur-
rently connects Carnivore to an ISP's Ethernet, but also allow for con-
nectivity developments in communications and surveillance
technologies.
CONCLUSION
The development of the Internet as a general communications
tool has provided new means for criminals to conduct illegal activities.
Carnivore is an impressive and important surveillance tool that the
FBI should use to monitor illegal activity occurring via the Intemet.
Because the current law is "hopelessly out of date" with modem tech-
nology, 96 there are no constitutional or statutory proscriptions on the
FBI's use of Carnivore to conduct pen mode surveillance. To accom-
modate privacy concerns and ensure appropriate use of Carnivore
and future surveillance technologies, it is imperative that Congress
amend the pen register section of ECPA at the earliest opportunity.
This Note presents the necessary statutory changes to accomplish this
objective. It is time for Congress to act.
(C) the number and, if known, physical location of the telephone
line or otherfacility to which the pen register trap and trace de-
vice is to be attached, conneeed, or applied and, in the case of a
trap and trace device, the geographic limits of the trap and
trace order ....
In addition, the amended § 3123(d), which prohibits disclosure of pen register or
trap and trace device installation, would read as follos (proposed changes italicized):
(d) Nondisclosure of existence of pen register or trap and trace device. An
order authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen register
or trap and trace device shall direct that-
(1) the order be sealed until otherwise ordered by the court; and
(2) the person owning or leasing the line or otherfailily to which the
pen register or trap and trace device is attached, connected, or ap-
plied, or wiw is obligated by the court to provide assistance to the ap-
plicant, not disclose the existence of the pen register or trap and
trace device or the existence of the investigation to the listed sub-
scriber, or to any other person, unless or until othenise ordered by
the court.
196 The Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the ECPA used the
same language to describe the pre-ECPA state of the law. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556 (quoting Senator Leahy, 132 CO.G.
REc. 14,600 (1986)).
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